Germany 's Distinguishable Military Culture

The German Command, in planning for a short and swift war, found themselves in a bind when the war started to prolong itself. From the very beginning, their plan started to fall apart, as Belgium, who they assumed would just let them march through to France, took up arms in resisting their approaches (Hull, 2005). The war would get longer and longer and seemed farther away from its conclusion as the months grew colder. As a result of this as well as their Prussian roots, they resorted to dangerously risky and destructive tactics, trying to bring the war to a quicker end while putting more of their resources in jeopardy, a move that eventually did not pay off and ended up leading to the German Empire’s demise (Hull, 2005).

During World War II, Germany’s military was superior to anyone else in the world, with far more advanced technology, tactics, and weaponry. They had a fearless leader who would stop at nothing to make his country great again. Their closest rival, the Soviet Union, was almost out of the picture with a death toll of over 26 million. On top of that, Germany had nothing to lose, and would not conceivably stop. So how then, with all odds against them, did the Allies win the war? A combination of factors affected Germany’s downfall, such as lack of morale, unwieldy weapons, and failure to work with its so-called allies.

The Schlieffen Plan is commonly – though misleadingy – identified with the German western offensive at the start of the First World War in August 1914, which began as a campaign of rapid movement but ended in deadlock and trench warfare. The plan is generally seen as a desperate gamble almost certain to fail, and its recklessness is counted as part of Germany’s war guilt – the plan held out the false promise of a quick victory, and so it underpinned the “short war illusion” that led Germany into a long war of attrition, ending with her defeat and collapse in 1918. This analysis confuses two quite different moments in history. The Schlieffen Plan was not designed to meet the strategic challenge Germany faced in 1914,

Militarism was felt very strongly in 20th century Europe. Between 1890 and 1914, the countries involved in WW1’s armament growth was tremendous. Germany’s army and navy rose

Between the years of 1914 to 1918, the whole of Europe was locked in arms, not only for pride but mostly for survival. The years of war brought devastation upon all societies. Men were massacred in droves, food stuff dwindled, and at times an end seemed non-existent. The foundation of the first Great War, one can muse, began as a nationalistic race between rival nations. By the onset of 1914, once the Archduke Frendinad had been assassinated in Saravejo, the march for war became not just a nationalistic opinion, but now a frenzy to fight. In battle, unlike previous wars, new weaponry caused drastic alterations in strategy. No longer will armies stand to face their rivals on the plains. Now the war will be fought in trenches, hidden

Throughout the book “Au Revoir Les Enfants” Louis Malle highlights at several points the typical associations which the majority of people have when discussing the role of the Germans during the war. However Malle approaches the topic from a more complex angle thus forcing the reader to question the general stereotypes and examine the varying attitudes of both the French and Germans, by portraying them in certain situations in which they adopt a sometimes unexpected attitude.

While the religious division of the Prussia Protestant and that of the dominating Austria Catholics was an important factor, the opposition from Austria and the rulers were more important. Nationalism became this progressively intensifying cycle that eventually climaxes into war. Many began to put aside the idealistic ideas of society and began to embrace the realities of society as competitive and combative. Under the calculated guidance of Otto von Bismarck, Germany would finally be on the promising path of unification.

WW11 started when Germany, Japan, and Italy were allied up and started to invade land. The USA, Soviet Union, and Great Britain were also allies. Japan, Italy, and Germany wanted to gain land. Japan wanted to take part of Asia and the south pacific. Germany wanted to take Northern and Eastern Europe. Italy wanted to take over Northern Africa and Greece. WW11 started on September 1st 1939 when Germany invaded Poland. Germany was led by Adolf Hitler; he had a style of warfare that was deadly. He used infantry, armor, artillery and aircraft work. In this type of war style they had to be able to communicate so they equipped every vehicle with a small radio to communicate with other vehicles. The German war style was called the Blitzkrieg. This

Prince Otto von Bismarck was seen as both a political genius and a power monger, like a German version of Alexander the Great by the people. Bismarck was a conservative, who used the people around him to reach his goals; and in doing so, he pitted people against one another. According to the book 19th Century Germany by John Breuilly, modern historians have found it very hard “to separate the man from his achievements” (Breuilly 172). The historians have run into a roadblock that consists mostly of “Bismarck’s individuality and his responsibility for the political development of the Empire” (Breuilly 172). Bismarck was known to support nationalism and patriotism, and he believed in the Burschenschaften or student organizations. He also believed in the concept of faith in power, more in ideas. Bismarck only cared for two things: Prussia and Prussian power, and he would do anything to obtain Prussian domination. Although Bismarck did not care for Germany, he was all for German Unification. Historians cannot decide if Bismarck’s legacy is positive or negative but they agree that he was a “brilliant and shrewd tactician who succeeded in postponing the problem of political mobilization for 60 years” (Breuilly 172). In Otto von Bismarck, some people saw a great man who was ahead of his time, while others saw nothing more than a bloodthirsty power monger, who wanted a united Germany to

Leading into the Fall of 1914, tactics on both sides of the line involved the rapid mobilization, maneuver and envelopment of the opposing side.10 Pre-1914 doctrine took little into account the effects of emerging new technology and their impact on both defensive and offensive operations. This disconnect between doctrine and technology contributed to the failure of early offensive operations in the Fall of 1914 and resulted in staggering casualties.11 Both sides developed doctrine that took into effect the unique terrain and technology that had been developed prior and during World War I. However by the end of the war, a combination of flexibility, decentralized control, and counterattack at every echelon made the German defensive system the most effective.12 This “elastic defense” had three unique characteristics; dedicated counter-attack force at all levels, decentralized command and control, fluid defensive belts and integrated artillery support at the Division level. Under this new doctrine, Corps headquarters had the role sustaining subordinate units, but not directing their actions during battle.13 This defense-in-depth and the lessons learned during the Verdun battles of 1918 were so successful that British forces adopted many of the German tactics with a special emphasis on their counterattack capability.10 Utilizing the new doctrine, by August 1918, Germany had made substantial gains, however had

Envious of the British navy and their place as a global power, the Kaiser was paranoid that GBR wanted to eliminate Germany. While Great Britain did not want to succumb to defensive strategies, most importantly, they did not want to irrationally attack. Despite that, the Kaiser was was still delusional that Great Britain sought to disintegrate the German state. The Kaiser’s field marshal and strategist Alfred von Schlieffen proclaimed that an offensive attack was the best defense, and became known as the cult of the offensive (Van Evera 1984). Eliciting fear throughout the nation sparked nationalism. Being offensive and in a position of authority, rather than a position of vulnerability, increases morale in soldiers and became a more powerful tool than any weapon. Wilhelm’s militaristic ideology led to a dangerous series of events by

Germany was not able to claim victory during World War II due to poor military guidance. Hitler’s military tactics led

Because Hitler’s vision did not translate into an effective strategic plan, with clear strategic objectives a disconnect between what Germany wanted to achieve (ends), the way it wanted to achieve it (ways), and the resources it would choose to utilize (means) was created. As such, it is this disconnection that also played a large role in Germany’s failure to translate its tactical and operational victories into strategic success and overall victory. Examples of this disconnect and the calamitous effects are clearly present in a quick analysis of the Battle of Britain.

Since the unification of Germany in the late 19th century, attitudes of nationalism, Prussian militarism and expansionism saturated German society. As one can clearly see in the

‘As one American veteran of Normandy and the Rhineland puts it: ‘until you’ve fought the German army, you have never fought a real battle’ ’ (Bungay, 2003). One of the reasons of such a reputation is the Auftragstaktik - an effective command philosophy which origins from Prussia in early 19th century, which in contrast to direct command approach is mission-oriented and based on local initiative within the superior’s intent. From the scratch Prussians and Germans managed developed command philosophy which is adapted by most of modern armies in the temporary world. ‘Auftragstaktik was not an idea introduced into German military thinking by decree. Far from simple or rapid, its adoption was a difficult, long-running process’ (Widder,