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Immanuel Kant, Rudolf Carnap And Mary Leng

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Knowledge about such objects as numbers and shapes has been debated by scholars including Immanuel Kant, Rudolf Carnap and Mary Leng. The ability to attain knowledge of something's existence encompasses philosophical ideas from a priori and a posteriori truths to ideas about universalism. Abstract ideas with concrete uses, such as shapes and numbers, are effective vehicles for such a discussion. I believe that mathematical objects exist as a priori truths and because they follow an axiomatic truth theory. The truth theory applied however, is unique to the metaphysical object being discussed.
According to Kant (1788), all knowledge that states fact is either ‘a priori’ (exists by definition) or ‘a posteriori’ (knowable by experience) and is …show more content…

This seems a trivial question, mathematics defines circles as 2-dimensional shapes made by drawing a curve that is always the same distance from a centre. Circles however seem to be more than just this. When one is asked to think of things, we think of cars, trees, apples, etc. all physical objects; things that exist in exact places at certain times. Circularity, Mumford explains, does not appear in one place, but in many at once. This is because circularity is a property similar to smoothness, greenness or solubility. As a result of this, there is no limit to how many objects can have circularity as a property at the same instance. Using more standard terminology, a property that can be a feature of more than one thing is called a ‘universal’. Mumford then considers whether destroying all circular objects would perhaps destroy circularity, but concludes that one would only have destroyed all instances of it, and its concept would remain. In a similar way to shapes, numbers can be thought of as more like adjectives or as properties, (example) and more specifically as universals too. Many would take issue, however, with the idea that universals exist at all. Universalists claim that universals are actual, not only ostensibly the case or some illusion, but do not exist in the same way as material objects do in space or time, but instead in a metaphysical form. In …show more content…

A statement such as ‘3+4=7’ is considered a mathematical truth, as if the mathematical objects 3, 4 and 7 exist and facts can be made about them. (Note that nominalists would not agree that numbers exist in this sense however, as nominalist theories are often motivated by empiricist standpoints, which find no place for the existence of non-spatiotemporal objects.) A potential problem with this is that one finds that mathematics has a hierarchy of abstraction, resulting in a plethora of more conceptual mathematical objects that become difficult to engage with. A given fact such as Fermat’s Last Theorem: ‘No three positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation a^n + b^n = c^n for any integer value of n greater than two’ which requires 150 pages to prove and consumed 7 years of Andrew Wiles’ life to do so. The concepts that unfold from such a proof can be known because they are derived from the axioms of mathematics in logic , which was first fully established in logicism in 1884 by Gottlob Frege (see ‘Thinking About Mathematics’ by Stewart Shapiro (2000), p.107-115). In this sense, all mathematical facts are justified, therefore knowledge of them is possible. Mathematical objects exist therefore because of how coherent and well-defined it is. It doesn’t make sense to say we know about something that doesn’t exist. So mathematics must exist in

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