The Fluctuating Fortunes Of Counterinsurgency : Is Tossing The Coin A Reasonable Approach?

Often called “The Crossroads of the World”, the Middle East stands between three continents: Asia, Africa, and Europe. Over thousands of years, migrating traders and conquerors crossed this region and spread the ideas, inventions, and achievements of many civilizations. It is an incredibly important part of the world with rich history, important resources, and deep religious and cultural traditions. However, in the past decades up to today, the Middle East has been consumed by conflict and chaos. Although different circumstances surround each issue, religion, terrorism, disputes over the control of natural resources, and weak governance primarily allow conflict to persist in the Middle East.

The disbanding of the Iraqi army and “debathification” or dismantling of the government in place only served to increase the casualties of American troops and Iraqi civilians as the radical Sunni insurgency expanded. This point of cause and effect, clash of two distinct political and cultural worlds, defined this war for the generation serving, at home and the future generations. The threat of increasing terrorism after the attack of September 11, 2001 was one of the driving force of invasion of Iraq. However, in one analysis the increase of global terrorism today is told to be well contributed by the conflicts that were fueled by the western presence in Iraq and the surrounding

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

While we deal with our own feelings of fear and anger regarding the violence perpetrated against us, both physical and non-physical, it’s important to remember that we aren’t the only ones who feel victimized in the conflict. Perhaps it is true that the Middle East, for the most part, distains the West, but not for nothing and not even

This paper will look at and discuss the presidency’s actions involving Iraq from Reagan to Obama. Each and every president during this time has used different strategies and formats to get their agenda across, to not only convince the public, but the international community as well. We will show how Iraq has gone from an ally to overthrowing the government, to the ensuing turmoil that this created for everyone involved, from ours and their citizenship, governing bodies, and other world leaders. With over 35 years of intervention, we will determine if there has been a consensus of actions among our presidents, and see if there is a cohesive US strategy and long term goals that have been reached for all our effort and actions to all of this.

Things move so far and so fast in the Middle East that some of the pieces here already seem like distant history just a year or two after happening and being written. If Iran, in 2013, ‘felt that the economic pressure and the credible threat of military intervention were to threaten its very survival, it might, just as Assad did with the chemical weapons, go as far as give up the entire nuclear program altogether.’ Before 2014 started was a relatively peaceful time. But of course, we know now that the West will never make such a threat, that the mullahs will have their way, and that the Americans are in retreat amidst the confused ruins of their policies as the Russians move in.

The Great Power involvement in the Middle East politics often creates and contributes to more conflicts and wars. The Middle East, a region described by Victor Israelyan as ‘one of sharp confrontation between the two superpowers unavoidably fell victim to such pressures.

Horton also states that the public is misinformed about why America is involved in this conflict. Horton writes, “ [The Government] then exploits the population’s ignorance and fear to advance their own unrelated and counterproductive political agenda” (Horton 3). The article shows how the war in Afghanistan was not really about

United States (U.S.) doctrine focuses its COIN methods on the ability to assist a host nation in building political legitimacy and creditability. Establishing political legitimacy is the foundation of COIN strategy enabling governments to create rapport with local leaders and gain the support of its communities while simultaneously eliminating an insurgency. Doctrine is subjective rather than prescriptive; however, failure to adhere to fundamental principles causes a good deal of contradiction on how to accomplish specific goals. Evidence provided in the COIN campaigns conducted in both Vietnam and Afghanistan showed flawed implementation of basic U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. That doctrine includes the ability to establish a valid political strategy, securing the populace all with a host nation in the lead effort. While these two wars have many differences, they are similar in ways. Specifically, how the U.S. failed to follow basic practices of COIN, and how leveraging lessons learned are paramount to U.S. strategic initiatives.

Instead of fostering cooperation, efforts to bring Sunni and Shiite elites together have only rubbed at raw wounds, exacerbated tensions and accelerated the slide toward a regional confrontation. ISIS is now targeting Shiite pilgrims in Saudi Arabia in order to enflame that country and widen the religious war that is brewing across the region. Iran is sponsoring terror armies across the region and trying to turn Shiite Iraq into a satellite state. A brutalizing dynamic is now firmly in place: Sectarian tension radicalizes the leaderships on both the Sunni and Shiite sides.

The United States’ prolonged stay in Afghanistan has lead some to label the war in Afghanistan a rerun of the war in Vietnam. While the two share some pertinent characteristics, the divergent characteristics of the wars far outweigh their similarities. That being said, some insights can be garnered from the war in Vietnam that are important to be considered in any conflict the U.S. should find itself in. An analysis of the U.S.’s entry, commitment, and exit in the Vietnam war indicate that a strong commitment to a clear and attainable exit strategy is imperative.

In March 2003, prior to the U.S. invasion to Iraq, a reporter noted to then Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that “Calling Iraq an insurgency or a guerilla war brings to mind Vietnam, which most people can agree was not a resounding success.” Rumsfeld replied, “The reporters are asking is it Vietnam yet? - hoping it is. And it isn’t. It’s a different time. It’s a different era. It’s a different place.” Defense Secretary Rumsfeld is correct in that there are many intricacies separating an analogous relationship between Afghanistan and Vietnam. Although it would be over simplification and gross negligence to say that military operations in Afghanistan is today’s version of the Vietnam war, there are similarities between both wars that are worthy

From as early as 1953 with the assistance in the coup to overthrow then Iranian leadership to the killing of Bin Laden, we see that America has had a hand in the Middle East and as fig.1 demonstrates and if to be believed, the problems that now find need for policies, competencies and leadership had the helping hand of the United Staten in creating the dis function in the region; as Malcolm X would so eloquently state “the chickens are finally coming home to roost.”

Throughout the course of history, particularly over the last century, the Middle East has been identified as a growing source of hostility and violence due to its extensive involvement in religious conflict, ethnic rivalry, territorial dispute, and war. Poor governance, as well as the absence of an effective civil society and the lack of the rule of law, has led to the demise of several states within the region. Such instability has fostered the growth of religious extremism and brutality while insurgent groups and established terrorist organizations have converted these territories into safe havens to facilitate their radical operations. As a result, almost every country in the Middle East

The first tenet of COIN aligns with the first two statements of COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance. The primary focus is on the people and earning their trust. The people function as the internal intelligence for the government and support the goal of eliminating, harboring and providing safe havens for the enemy. This effort is supported by the United States Soldiers and its allies taking up residence in the community with the Afghanistan people. This also reinforces President Obama core element of a civilian surge to reinforce positive action. It is imperative to get the people out in the public view and not living in fear. Constant and daily interaction is essential in gathering local intelligence on what is going in the government in hopes of understanding how the people feel and think about their leadership. Communication is helpful but being a good listener is an invaluable asset to information gathering. Secondly, the United States military goal is to support the fostering of renewed trust of the Afghanistan people in their government and security forces. The ultimate goal is that the Afghanistan people reject the insurgents and stop them from infiltrating their infrastructure. This approach was taught by