The Nature Of Warfare By Martin E. Dempsey

In “War is a Racket” General Butler laments the use of propaganda in World War 1, and he notes

Ever since the beginning of time, there has been conflict and conflict will always play a role in the development of history. The world has experienced hundreds of wars with countless casualties, these wars date back to the 10th Century and forward to the present. The United States of America is no stranger to war having participated in over 100 wars either it being a small war or a world war. Michael C. C. Adams “The Best War Ever” gives a rational explanation on the events that led the U.S to become the powerhouse country after sacrificing so much for the war, or did they? In this paper we will support the argument made in Adams “The Best War Ever” Chapter four, appropriately titled “The American War Machine”, other primary sources used will be such as Harry S. Truman first speech to congress in April 1945 and General George S. Patton’s praise speech to the Third Army. The argument being that the U.S did in fact play an impacting role in the outcome of World War 2 but how it also used appearances as an advantage to further develop itself as an international force, just like the tale from the Trojan War, the Trojan horse was all about appearances but with a precise objective.

The U.S. Constitution provides power to the President and Congress to develop and enact national security policy (Ulrich, 1). As such our civilian leaders have the right and responsibility to maintain oversight of the military. Two civil-military relations theories, Normal and Clausewitzian, offer competing views. The Normal theory suggests officers are professionals and interference from civilian leaders is inappropriate (Cohen, 4). The Clausewitzian theory contends the statesman may inject himself in any aspect of military strategy since

One of Clausewitz’s many famous theories is that ‘war is merely a continuation of policy by other means.’ This theory is proven correct once again

According to Hedley Bull, war is “organized violence waged by sovereign states” which was the outcome of a “process of limitation or confinement of violence” via the ethical doctrine of just war theory. Clausewitz classified warfare as not just an act, but also a social institution for obtaining ulterior objectives (e.g. political) and strategic lines of command within and between states. He defined the social relationship between forces and the elements of war (rationality, chance and violence). Martin Shaw claims that contemporary warfare has completely evolved so that the “core of the new mode of warfare is a different general relationship between war fighting and the political, economic, and cultural-ideological domains.” (Nowaczynski, J. (2012, December). E-International Can

War is a human endeavor. Humanity continually pursues solutions to counter evolving threats with the end of preserving power while also enabling peace. Civilizations resort to war to maintain their perception of this equilibrium. Defined threats and adversaries have changed throughout history, however, the essence of human nature and the base concept of conflict itself have not. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories on warfare capture the relationship between humanity and its application of war, remaining relevant in today’s era through their pensive explanations of timeless philosophical principles regarding the concept of war. These theories regarding war in politics, the key factors affecting war, and the extent that war is applied are inherently interconnected, providing insight on the relationships between humanity and its application of war.

In Margaret Mead’s "Warfare: An Invention - Not a Biological Necessity" we see her ideas surrounding the relationship between biological and cultural influences on an aspect of life and society. Mead’s ideas play off of some of the thoughts mentioned in Ruth Benedict’s “The Individual and the Pattern of Culture”. Benedict mentions how there “...is always a give and take,”(114) that is between culture and the individual. Which can be related to Mead’s mention of how war or fighting is dependant on a culture's need for that kind of outlet. Because Mead was a student of Benedict’s when she was a professor at Columbia University(112) it becomes evident how some of the similarities in their ideas had developed.

Nature of war which usually remains unchanged irrespective of changes in environment or war. Four elements of nature of war are; ‘greater political nature’, ‘human dimension’, ‘uncertainty’, and final one is ‘contest of wills.’ The trinity of war, Clausewitz 's famous theory, comprises three basic elements of warfare are ‘people; the second commander and his army; and the third the government, ' essential basis for successful military operations. He describes these three tendencies are must be balanced to

The post WWII era has been a period that generated several changes in how commanders have driven the war. The art of war has extend contributions of Carl Von Clausewitz. The long process of maturation of his theories took several years. During this period, Clausewitz wrote and re-wrote his ideas concerning war. Because the time since On War was written it seems Clausewitz’s theories are useless or invalid, however, conflicts since 1945 have validated most of Clausewitz’s theories, which are a school of thoughts that remain adequate for explaining warfare in the current century. The purpose of this paper is to explain how conflicts since 1945 have validated the theories of Carl Von Clausewitz. Finally, conclusions suggest the significance to today’s military profession.

Clausewitz said that war is more than a chameleon, that simply changes its appearance as its environment changes. War being is more than a true chameleon; it is actually a paradoxical trinity that, in short, is made up of primordial violence, chance, and reason with these three variables constantly in tension with each other. The example of the Iran-Iraq war underlines that war has some consequences on domestic policy. Indeed, this war allowed to the Islamic Republic to increase its hold on the Iranian society by legitimating the

Determining the nature of the conflict is a crucial first step in understanding what is required to develop an effective strategy. Iraq presented the United States with a highly complex, complicated, and challenging environment to fully understand and assess. The longstanding religious conflicts, unequal wealth distribution, limited economic development, disenfranchised young male population, presence of terrorism, and a multitude of other factors increased the difficulty of assessing the battlefield in Iraq. Any change to the status quo could lead to second and third order effects, which would only further convolute the situation in Iraq. Clausewitz once stated, “The nature of war is complex and changeable,” and the battlefield in Iraq was no exception. In order for the United States Administration to develop an effective strategy, a solid understanding of the nature of the conflict was required. The initial strategy failed to properly balance the ends,

These politics do not have to be just foreign or international politics, but also domestic politics. To achieve these objectives, Clausewitz believed in two levels of war: strategic and tactical (Echevarria, 1995). One must also remember that Clausewitz did not believe war could be down to a science, it is far too diverse and unpredictable. He was a strong believer that a theory is an explanation, not a solution. In “On War” Clausewitz states, "the primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled” (Clausewitz, 1832). His theory harps on this idea that if conflict of politics reaches an emotional high, organized violence can breakout. Clausewitz’s theory today is taught with “policy” and “politics” as interchangeable components. However, Clausewitz created his theory based around a dual meaning. He believed war could lose sight of its policy aims, but war could never escape politics. On this basis, he combined three forces into one, which is referred to as ‘wondrous trinity’ (Echevarría 1995).

Martin van Creveld wrote The Transformation of War book in 1991 when he detailed a predictive hypothesis about the changing character of war into what he called ?Nontrinitarian War. There were conflicts arise as intrastate wars and were not based on the simplified version of Clausewitz?s ?remarkable trinity? of government, people and military forces (Van Creveld, 1991, pg. 49). In his book, Van Creveld offers an account of warfare in the previous millennium and suggests what the future might hold. The drive was that major war was draining and the emergence of forms of war ?that are simultaneously old and new? now threatened to create havoc.

Defining cyber-warfare is also important but suffers from the same lack of continuity between United States military branches and government agencies. Schaap lists varying terminology used ranging from the Department of Defense’s definition which states, “the employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects through cyber-space” to the Air Force’s definition, “the integrated planning and employment

As the future of warfare becomes more sophisticated, what will be the military technology of tomorrow? The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, believes that there are three possible answers to that question: nuclear warfare, biological/chemical warfare, or cyber warfare. While nuclear and biological warfare is conducted on a battlefield, cyber warfare operates via the Internet and computers. All of these weapons have the same destructive potential, but the circumstances surrounding