Us's Coin Strategy

Theoretically, it holds that the United States (US) invaded Afghanistan as a self-defense strategy following the 9/11 attacks. Practically, however, as US foreign policy is about conquest, self-protection and resource-extraction, it seeks strategic dominance of geographical space to sustain its global relevance. The rationality of the US suggests the need to continuously accumulate capital, resources and military proficiency to ensure autonomy. Therefore, a pragmatic reading into the motivation behind the invasion of Afghanistan negates the self-defense theory. Rather, the shifting coordinates of power within central and southern Asia crafted the perfect criteria for US intervention. This work explores the motivations and systemic cover-ups designed by the Bush administration in ordering military troops into Afghanistan in 2001. It will hold that this invasion was not just a War on Terror, but rather a tactic to ensure US prevalence within the region, and henceforth, the rest of the world. Thus, why did the US invade Afghanistan?

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

For over 2 centuries, Afghanistan has known virtually no time without war. Beginning around 326 B.C. with the conquests of Alexander the Great, to the Persians, British, Russians and most recently, America and our NATO allies, Afghanistan has been cultivated into the country that it is today through a trial by fire. Regardless of this relentless onslaught of foreign military power, the Afghan people have tirelessly defended their homeland with no outside power ever being able to subdue them completely. Following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989, the country fell into civil war, torn even further apart by fiercely dedicated tribal warlords. This power vacuum led to the rise of a group called the Taliban. Led by a one eyed man

suffered the same issues during the 2003 Iraq War and made the same mistakes the British made in the American Revolutionary war. The U.S. failed to allocate the proper number of troop strength. The lack of control of the civilian population and the mistakes the U.S. made in Abu Ghraib became the rally cry for the insurgents. (Montanus, 2005) The United States initially losing the hearts and minds of the populous and as a result there were more Iraqis supporting the efforts against the United States. The difference between the U.S. now and the British 200 years ago, the U.S. adapted and formed a strategy to help the local populace. The U.S. opened dialogues with the Tribes to resolve conflicts and issues in order to win their support for the war. The U.S. assisted the Iraqi’s create a democratic government, provided logistic support and training of the country’s security forces, and resulted in stabilizing the country. (Montanus, 2005) The U.S. established a Counter-Insurgency

Operation Anaconda was a subordinate joint combat operation, during Operation Enduring Freedom, (Lyle 2012) to be carried out in the Shahi Kot Valley located in southeastern Afghanistan. Operations planning took place in February of 2002 and was executed from 2-16 March. The operational purpose was to capture or kill, what was reported to be, “The largest concentration of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan”. Operation Anaconda Case Study (2003) In order to undertake a mission of this magnitude and scope, unity of command would prove critical. The task organization of Operation Anaconda involved both joint and multinational assets. Operation Anaconda lacked unity

1. In President Obama’s speech at West Point, he announced that 30,000 additional troops would be sent to Afghanistan. He made this decision because he said it was vital to the United States’ national interest. The vital national interest at risk in President Obama’s address is the security and safety of the American people as well as the “security of our allies and the common security of the world.” By involving the military and increasing the troop strength, President Obama can achieve the objectives of his strategy. His objectives are to keep the Taliban from becoming powerful, prevent them from government rule, improve Afghanistan security forces and government so they can manage their own country and prevent Al Qaeda from

The U.S. military made the same mistakes initially in the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. failed to allocate the proper number of troop strength, failed to adapt to the terrain, and failed to foresee the used of improvised explosive device (IED). The U.S. also lacked control of the civilian population, and the mistakes in Abu Ghraib became the rally cry for the insurgents, which the Iraqis rose to support the insurgency. (Montanus, 2005) However, the lessons learned from the British 200 years ago, the U.S. adapted and formed a concept to win the hearts of mine of the people into their counterinsurgency operation. The U.S. allocated more troops, adapted to the terrain, and employed new method to defeat IEDs. Furthermore, they opened dialogues with the Tribes, resolved conflicts, and addressed issues in order to win their support for the war. The U.S. assisted the Iraqi’s create a democratic government, provided logistic support, training

Every year, since the Taliban regime ended, foreign troop numbers within the country have increased dramatically. The greatest increase of troops was about twenty thousand additional troops added to the grand total of sixty-six thousand. With increased troops, the Taliban activity has also intensified. Mullah Saifur Reheman, a Taliban, began to rebuild his militia forces to support the anti- United States fighters. His forces amounted to over one thousand by the beginning of Operation Anaconda in March of 2002. Rebels against the revolution had planned to use the region as headquarters for launching guerrilla attacks (Shapiro). The United States used Kandahar International Airport as an operational base for taking and dispersing personnel and supplies. The number of U.S. troops who operated in the country grew to more than ten thousand against the al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Eventually, the United States and its allies drove the Taliban from power and curtailed al Qaeda’s efforts to plan and execute terrorist attacks at a high cost. The United States special inspector for Afghanistan reconstruction has reported that, when the security for aid workers is counted, the total amount of nonmilitary funds that Washington has appropriated since 2002 “is about one-hundred billion dollars (Emadi).” That is more than the United States has ever spent trying to rebuild a country. There is no need to spend that much money to have an impact, that money just needs to be spent well. In

As America find herself in today’s “War on Terrorism,” one can easily find a number of similarities between today’s situation and the war in Vietnam. As the Taliban steadily loses control and power over Afghanistan, it becomes exceedingly important to discuss potential replacement governments. Afghanistan is, like Vietnam in the 50’s and 60’s, a very volatile country full of a variety of people speaking different dialects and practicing different religions. It is very important, then, that the government that is installed is one that is capable of maintaining some type of control or authority over its diverse people.

The Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) quarterly report for January is a bleak read. At close to 30%, not only do the Taliban hold more Afghan territory than any time after the 2001 invasion, but "The insurgency is spreading (Afghan forces) thin, threatening rural districts in one area while carrying out ambitious attacks in more populated centers." The Taliban trifecta of high-stakes attacks in late 2015 adds weight to SIGAR’s assessment. Moreover, even before militants briefly overran Kunduz, Kandahar airport and besieged Sangin district, UN figures revealed a 19% increase in “security incidents” between August and October.

Many people believe that the persistent armed conflict in Afghanistan is was beginning to resemble another famous war that the United States has been in: The Vietnam War. Some people have coined it “Americas Second Vietnam” There are many similarities between the two wars, the majority pertaining to Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations and campaigns.

In an age when mankind has the ability to completely annihilate itself through nuclear combat, war can be a more terrifying and powerful thought than ever before. Unfortunately, because of the extent of the actions that the Taliban has committed against both America and its own followers, the United States’ war against terrorism seems to be a necessity. I do feel, however, as if there are many things that can be done by the American government in the near future to peacefully approach a more civil and politically involved Afghanistan. Although my feelings on a war against terrorism are mixed, I do feel that significant actions must be taken in order to restrict the spread of

Conventional warfare that is prolonged and resource intensive is not sustainable and eventually leads to descent into attrition type warfare. Irregular warfare operations, be it COIN or counter-terrorism, from the Western perspective consume time and resources. This consumption is predominantly fuelled by the asymmetry of Western and insurgent forces which results in significantly different tactics being used by the two forces. Western powers, in almost all cases, tend to have superior technology and a larger number of forces and rely heavily on these factors during conflicts, however this perceived imbalance of power is not necessarily advantageous for the Western power. Andrew Mack discusses this idea that military superiority does not always result in victory when facing an unconventional enemy, Mack states " In such asymmetric conflicts, insurgents may gain political victory from a situation of military stalemate or even defeat." Here Mack surfaces the idea of 'political capital' and argues that insurgents' ability to win wars stems from "...the progressive attrition of their opponents' political capability to wage war." This concept is solidified if we observe the planned withdrawal from Afghanistan, after having a Western military presence in the nation for over ten years, public support has declined and it is no longer politically viable to continue operations in that theatre. Insurgents continue to function in this state and the threat of

The first tenet of COIN aligns with the first two statements of COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance. The primary focus is on the people and earning their trust. The people function as the internal intelligence for the government and support the goal of eliminating, harboring and providing safe havens for the enemy. This effort is supported by the United States Soldiers and its allies taking up residence in the community with the Afghanistan people. This also reinforces President Obama core element of a civilian surge to reinforce positive action. It is imperative to get the people out in the public view and not living in fear. Constant and daily interaction is essential in gathering local intelligence on what is going in the government in hopes of understanding how the people feel and think about their leadership. Communication is helpful but being a good listener is an invaluable asset to information gathering. Secondly, the United States military goal is to support the fostering of renewed trust of the Afghanistan people in their government and security forces. The ultimate goal is that the Afghanistan people reject the insurgents and stop them from infiltrating their infrastructure. This approach was taught by

As a consequence, many fragile states (which are also the most vulnerable) have often ended up with the risks of insecurity, violence, and conflict. Therefore, the dilemmas currently being faced in Iraq and Afghanistan are just few of the examples of the latest post-conflict peace-building experience (Mazarr, M., 2014, January/February). The current post-conflict peace-building efforts appear to favor state building over nation building, in the way that it focus narrowly on institutions such as the bureaucracy, to the neglect of the informal mechanisms that underlies the risks of outbreak of violent conflict.