Why Was The Peloponnesian War Inevitable

Pericles, the Athenian leader, avoided land battles and concentrated on control of the sea. After Pericles' death, the Athenians signed a fifty year truce called the Peace of Nicias in 421. This provided that each side restore captured places and prisoners and remain at peace with each other. This was soon supplemented by an actual Athenian-Spartan alliance, which concluded for fifty years. The intention was chiefly to give each power a chance to put its own alliance in order while secure from an attack by the other. The war had been marked by numerous acts of brutality on both sides; prisoners had been slaughtered or enslaved, and agreements broken in a way that were shameful. (Winks)

Amidst an interlude in the fierce struggle for power between the two dominant Greek poleis, Athens and Sparta, the Peloponnesian war, there was unrest. Despite the Peace of Nicias, belligerence between the two states did not cease, but rather took on a new face. While careful to remain within the parameters set several years before in the peace treaty, Athens moved cautiously, but aggressively in establishing alliances, albeit coerced, and strengthening its empire. It was at this juncture that it made its move toward securing the small, weak island-state of Melos, which in its neutral independence suggested danger to the Athenian empire. In a move not of fairness, but of survival, Athens offered the Melians an ultimatum: to be subjugated

In his ambitions to conquer Sicily and then move on to Italy and the Peloponnesus, he also shows this thirst.12 The Athenians recognized Alcibiades's brilliance and ruthlessness so they elected Nicias as a general to "[temper] his rashness."13 Alcibiades resorted to violence to gain glory, Pericles, on the other hand, attempted to prolong peace and settle matters with diplomacy. He once tried to persuade the cities to send delegates to meet in Athens to discuss restorations of temples destroyed during the war with Persia, but nothing came of his plan because of Spartan opposition.14 He even went so far as to bribe the chief magistrates of Sparta to buy time to prepare for war, which he knew was inevitable.15

Throughout the Ancient Greek world, there have been many wars and standoffs. However, there has been only one which changed the course of Greek history forever; the Peloponnesian War. Caused by the growing tension between Athens and Sparta, it came and left, leaving only destruction in its wake. The defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War caused the downfall of Greece, and the end of the Classical Age.

"Just before the Peloponnesian War began, Pericles of Athens and King Archidamus of Sparta provided net assessments of the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the two sides. Evaluate their projections."

It is remarkable how timeless the Speech of Archidamus is. One could easily imagine the Spartan King were speaking to a modern occupied territory, itching for a revolt. King Archidamus urges the Spartans to head caution when entering war with Athens. He has “seen too many wars” [pg 25, 80] The battles he has witnessed in his lifetime have swayed him of any naive fascination with war. He has learned that violence begets violence, so one should only enter a battle they are prepared to win. Archidamus explains that Athens is stronger in terms of wealth, military might and political power. If the Spartans take the offensive route under these circumstances, they will surely loose both in combat and in terms of public relations. [pg 26, 81] Furthermore, Archidamus explains later that Athens had agreed to mediation, making any fight that Sparta were to start an unlawful preemptive attack. [pg 28, 85] The King assures his people he is not blind to their suffering, he just envisions better ways of ending it. [pg 26, 82] One of these methods would be to create partnerships with other nations who would lend armed forces and capital to the cause. To be done in tandem with confederation would be the accumulation of Sparta’s assets. Archidamus predicts that under these circumstances, Athens could be motivated to surrender. Under the very different circumstances from which he is speaking, the King pushes to avoid war at all costs citing that “complaints can be resolved, whether they are

During the following years, the Athenians decided to take the offensive by attacking the city of Syracuse. They campaigned all throughout western Greece and even the Peloponnese. By 425 B.C., it wasn’t looking good for Sparta and they wanted to bring about peace. They soon, however, gained victory of Chalcidice and Athens were encouraged to revolt, but in a battle at Amphipolis in 422 B.C., two major leaders of Sparta and Athens were killed and Athenians were persuaded to accept Sparta’s peace

In 431 B.C., even before the Peloponnesian War, Athens’ strength compared to other Greek polises was evident. Athens had islands, a powerful, a well-trained navy, and one, if not the best, general at the time: Pericles. Pericles says in his speech that, “war is inevitable,” but in fact the war was preventable (72). Even with all of the military strengths and assets that Athenians had afforded to them, they chose to be merciful to the Peloponnesians who were in no shape to go to war. They did not have the experience, money, manpower, or means to participate in a lengthy war and Pericles makes the citizens aware of this (70). Pericles is both modest and humble for choosing to point out these facts which in turn helps the Athenians see the potential

The political failure of the Greek led the country to a great war. According to Herodotus, who dedicate his life writing real ancient stories in the fifth century BC shows that the catalyst was a political conflict in Miletus started Persian war. Athens, Sparta and other polies

Argos received an excuse from the Delphic oracle to keep it from battle (Hdt. VII.148-152), and Messene was “so corrupted that [it] even tried to prevent Sparta’s attempts to come to Greece’s aid” (Plato, 692d). Other city-states avoided participation in the wars as well. The oracle also excused Crete from fighting (Hdt. VII.169), and the tyrant Gelon of Syracuse refused to let his state help Greece’s cause (Brunt 158-162). If these poleis had chosen to fight, the Persians may have been intimidated by the large Greek forces and avoided war. The Greeks instead presented an image of a nation torn by cowardice, thereby making the Persians more confident in attacking Greece. This lack of unity among the city-states created some

The Peloponnesian War was an ancient Greek war fought between Athens and Sparta’s Peloponnesian League. The Peloponnesian War had many causes which included anti-Athenian feelings by the Peloponnesian League and competitive feelings for power. It began when Athens started to dominate and treat other members of the delian league like subjects. This in turn caused Sparta to refuse to join the delian league so he created a rival league which was the Peloponnesian League.

The Peloponnesian war (431–404 BC) was an ancient Greek war fought by Athens against the Peloponnesian led by Sparta. Thucydides famously claims that the war started “because the Spartans were afraid of further growth of Athenian power, seeing as they did have the greater part of Hellas was under the control of Athens”. The two main protagonists from opposing sides Lysander and Alcibiades had the most influential impact on the end of the war.

of events which I am going to look at to see if there was a single

When Sparta gave its ultimatum to Athens, Pericles was more than happy to oblige and go to war. He embodies Athenian arrogance and overzealousness. Pericles speaks to the Athenian assembly convincing them to go to war because according to him, they cannot lose. Pericles explains how Sparta doesn’t have the same financial advantages that Athens does and how Athens has a far superior navy. According to Pericles, the best strategy is to use that to Athens’ advantage, leaving Attica exposed by only attacking and defending the sea were they have an advantage. Pericles finishes of by saying that Athens possesses all of Sparta’s strengths and none of its weaknesses, and Athens must fight so that future generations will have an Athens that is as good as ever.

This essay examines the evolution of the Athens strategy from the beginning to the end of The Peloponnesian War (431 to 404 BCE). The Strategy will be evaluated in the context of the relationship of ends, means, and ways by testing the suitability, acceptability, feasibility, and risk.