14 Which of the following is the basis of the prisoner's dilemma scenario? A Losses from collusion are larger than the payoffs that are received. Gains from cooperation are larger than the rewards from pursuing self-interest. CO Losses from cooperation are smaller than the payoffs from collusion. Gains from collusion are smaller than the rewards from pursuing self-interest.

14 Which of the following is the basis of the prisoner's dilemma scenario? A Losses from collusion are larger than the payoffs that are received. Gains from cooperation are larger than the rewards from pursuing self-interest. CO Losses from cooperation are smaller than the payoffs from collusion. Gains from collusion are smaller than the rewards from pursuing self-interest.

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9E

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Two firms are playing an infinitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma pricing game of the following form: Firm 1 Firm 2 Low price High Price Low price 4, 4 20, 0 High price 0, 20 12,12 Consider the decision to cheat ONLY ONCE for a firm in this game against the opponent that is a Tit-for-Tat player. Cheating firm gets an extra in payoffs for the first round, but has to face $0 payoffs for the second round in order to be able to bring the opponent to the collusive outcome again in the third round. What is the minimum rate of return (r) that would make defecting only once? Show your calculations.
Table 2 below represents the payoff matrix for two firms, X and Y, who compete with each other. Payoffs are in millions of pounds (£) profit. Each firm may choose one of two strategies i.e. set a high price for its output or set a low price for its output. Neither firm knows what strategy the other will adopt. Table 2 11. Firm Y High Price Low Price Firm X High Price X-£7mn, Y-£7mn X=£1mn, Y=£15mn Low Price X-£15mn, Y-£1mn X=£4mn, Y=£4mn In the absence of collusion, which combination of strategies is most likely to occur? a) X sets a low price and Y sets a low price. b) X sets a high price and Y sets a low price. c) X sets a low price and Y sets a high price. d) X sets a high price and Y sets a high price.
Game Theory. Consider the following scenario: Two cloth manufacturing companies, A and B. Firm A designs a few costumes, and they are confident enough that they will be sold quickly in the market, but after launching their designs, they make very little profit due to a lack of capital to promote their designs. Now firm B uses these designs and makes a significant profit due to its brand value. 1. Demonstrate that the situation IS a game (explain strategic interaction/conflict).
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. OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, was founded in 1969. Their original objective was to form a cartel to increase the price that they receive for their oil exports. Create a prisoner’s dilemma type game for two large members of OPEC (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Indonesia). Create numbers, where payoffs are total annual oil export revenues for each of these two countries. Verbally explain how you got your numbers. Find the Nash equilibrium. Based on this model, what strategy is in the oil exporters’ best interest (Nash or otherwise)? How do they make it happen? Create another prisoner’s dilemmamodel for all of OPEC on one side, and all non OPEC oil exporting nations on the other side. Create numbers, where payoffs are total annual oil export revenues for each of the two sides. Verbally explain how you created your numbers. Also create your numbers applying the fact that OPEC’s total production capacity is greater than total non OPEC exports…
Part 2: First Long Question There are two French bakeries in a small town: Le Meilleur Croissant (C), owned by Camille, and Le Meilleur Pain Au Chocolat (P), owned by Paul. In each period of an infinitely repeated game, they compete a la Bertrand, with market demand given by Q(pmin) = 10 - Pmin- Even though they sell identical goods, they have different marginal costs: cc = 2 and %3D Cp = 4 (Paul bakes just as well but is bad at business decisions). There are no fixed costs. Question 6 Turns out that Camille and Paul are married, and so they choose prices to maximize the joint profits of the two firms. Because both love baking and love each other, they also jointly decide that both firms should be selling positive amounts in their optimal plan. What prices do they choose? Pc = 6, pp = 11 Pc = 6.5, pp = 6.5 Pc = 6, pp = 6 Pc = 7, pp = 7 %3D O pc = 6, pp = 7
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While game theory predicts non-cooperative behavior for a one-shot Prisoner's dilemma. By repeating the game, say 20 rounds, it becomes possible to adopt more complex strategies that allow cooperative play as a Nash Equilibrium in at least some rounds of the game. True False
What is a tit for tat strategy? Why might it be a rational strategy in and infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma?
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2. Consider the following "location game." There are two ice cream sellers (Seller 1 and Seller 2) in a small city. Residents are uniformly located on a straight street of length 1. The ice cream sellers need to choose where to set up their carts, and each resident will purchase one unit of ice cream from the nearest seller. The city council has fixed the price of the ice cream, and as a result, each seller just wants sell as much ice cream as possible. (a) We think of this "location game" as a simultaneous-move game, in which each player's payoff is the proportion of residents that buy from her cart. Is this game with discrete strategies or continuous strategies? Please state the set of (pure) strategies for both sellers. Is this game zero-sum or non-zero-sum? (b) Find all NE(s) of this game. (c) Is there an alternative pair of locations for the sellers such that the residents’ total walking distance is reduced but neither seller is hurt? Is it an NE? (d) Suppose now that there are…