2. (Finitely Repeated Game). Consider the following simultaneous move game as depicted below is played twice. The players observe the actions chosen in the first stage of the game prior to the second stage. What are the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game? Player 2 B1 B2 B3 Player A1 10, 10 2,12 0,13 1 A2 12,2 5,5 0,0 A3 13,0 0,0 1,1

Microeconomic Theory
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Chapter8: Game Theory
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2. (Finitely Repeated Game). Consider the following simultaneous move game as
depicted below is played twice. The players observe the actions chosen in the
first stage of the game prior to the second stage. What are the pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game?
Player 2
B1
B2
B3
Player
A1
10, 10
2,12
0,13
1
A2
12,2
5,5
0,0
A3
13,0
0,0
1,1
Transcribed Image Text:2. (Finitely Repeated Game). Consider the following simultaneous move game as depicted below is played twice. The players observe the actions chosen in the first stage of the game prior to the second stage. What are the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game? Player 2 B1 B2 B3 Player A1 10, 10 2,12 0,13 1 A2 12,2 5,5 0,0 A3 13,0 0,0 1,1
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