24. Consider adverse selection in the car insurance market. Drivers are either risky or safe. The insurance companies cannot distinguish between the two types of drivers, but they know that 50% of all drivers are risky. Insuring a risky driver costs $3,000, while insuring a safe driver costs $1,000. The benefits of insurance is $4,000 for a risky driver and $1,500 for a safe driver. If insurers cannot observe the type of buyer they are insuring, what is the minimum equilibrium price of insurance? a. $1,000 b. $1,500 c. $2,000 d. $3,000 e. $4,000

24. Consider adverse selection in the car insurance market. Drivers are either risky or safe. The insurance companies cannot distinguish between the two types of drivers, but they know that 50% of all drivers are risky. Insuring a risky driver costs $3,000, while insuring a safe driver costs $1,000. The benefits of insurance is $4,000 for a risky driver and $1,500 for a safe driver. If insurers cannot observe the type of buyer they are insuring, what is the minimum equilibrium price of insurance? a. $1,000 b. $1,500 c. $2,000 d. $3,000 e. $4,000

ECON MICRO

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337000536

Author:William A. McEachern

Publisher:William A. McEachern

Chapter14: Transaction Costs, Asymmetric Information, And Behavioral Economics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3.8P

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6. Suppose that there are two types of drivers: reckless and safe. Reckless drivers have a higher probability of accidents with an expected loss to the insurance company of $5000. Safe drivers have a lower probability of accidents with an expected loss to the insurance company of $1000. Insurer cannot distinguish between reckless and safe drivers but know that reckless drivers make up "B" proportion of all drivers. What single premium should the risk-neutral insurer charge? Assume that the insurance market is perfectly competitive. Is the above mentioned problem an example of Adverse Selection or Moral Hazard? Explain.
Nathan's income in a typical year is 75,000. There is a 10 percent chance that Nathan will be seriously ill next year, incurring 15,000 in medical expenses. Samantha also earns 75,000 in a typical year. Her chance of becoming seriously ill next year and incurring ur 15,000 in medical expenses is 20 percent. a. Calculate the actuarially fair premium for full insurance for (i) Nathan and (ii) Samantha. b. Suppose that a private insurance firm cannot distinguish between Nathan and Samantha in terms of their risk and assumes the risk of being seriously ill in the general population is 10%. In this context, discuss the adverse selection problem the firm might face. c. Can a compulsory, government - run health insurance program avoid the problem of adverse selection? Explain why or why not.
1)Describe an example of moral hazard that we may run into in the real world. Think of something that is legal and not inherently lethal, yet still demonstrates elevated risk for the participant who would likely act safer if insurance or protection was not available. Explain why someone might take this risky action. What are the benefits to the risky behavior? In your response to two of your peers, explain what an insurance company may do to reduce the likelihood that an individual would take this risk. Keep in mind, that we cannot always just deny coverage if an individual is participating in the risky behavior.
4. What kind of liability insurance protects you now as an EMT and as a student paramedic in your clinical sites? 5. At the scene of a shooting, you can see a patient with slow, gasping respirations, but the police will not let you enter the crime scene. How will you feel? 6. Your patient is critical, and you cannot secure the airway. Medical direction tells you to divert because they have no ICU beds. You repeat the urgency of your patient's condition and are still told to divert. You elect to override the physician's order and transport to that hospital. Can you justify disobeying the physician's order! .
A9 Describe an example of adverse selection that we may run into in the real world. How does adverse selection impact the policy holders for this specific type of insurance for: High risk participants? Low risk participants? What is one government regulation that has been enacted in the last 20 years that helps either high risk or low risk policy holders in the United States
2. Below is a market for health insurance, with 5 people. Their expected costs, risk premiums, and willingness to pay for insurance are given. The average expected costs are 92. a.Suppose an insurance company offers a premium equal to 92. Determine who will buy and won't buy at that premium (top chart to fill in). Find the insurer's revenue, expenses and profit at that premium (bottom chart to fill in). Then repeat for the higher premiums in periods 2 and 3. Expected Risk Period 1 Willingness Premium to Pay 22 Period 2 Period 3 Costs Premium=$92 Premium=$130 Premium=$180 Person 1 20 2 Person 2 40 5 45 Person 3 80 15 95 Person 4 120 30 150 Person 5 200 60 260 Total 460 Mean 92 Insurer Revenue Insurer Expenses Profit a. Over time, what is happening to the number and type of people in the market for insurance, and what is happening to insurer profits? +
12. Why do individuals act in riskier ways after being insured? A. Due to the problem of adverse selection B. Due to the problem of false confidence C. Due to the problem of moral hazard D. Due to the problem of screening costs
2. Two individuals have the same income ($100,000), but different potential healthcare expenses. Person A's probability of having $80,000 in healthcare expenses is 0.5 percent. Person B's probability of having $800 in healthcare expenses is 50 percent. Assume your utility is U = VI where I is your income. Calculate each person's expected income and expected utility. Calculate each person's certainty equivalent. What does value of the certainty equivalent tell you about how much each person would be willing to insure against their loss?
ease use utility of wealth function in the booK, 8-1 (see below). Certainty Utility B D 200 198 194 D' Total utility 170 of wealth C' Expected Utility A 140 10,000 15,000 19,000 20,000 Wealth FIGURE 8-1 Total Utility of Wealth and the Impact of Insurance Please explain the difference between the certainty utility line and the expected utility line b. Calculate your E(U), given an 80% change of being healthy and 20% of being sick, knowing that your income falls to $10,000 and your utility is 140 if you get sick. Calculate your E(W), given an 80% change of being healthy and 20% of being sick. d. Given that your Certainty Utility Function is U = 200Y-0.00154 and Y is your income, what is your Certainty Utility with insurance (if you are risk averse) What insurance premium will you pay to guarantee a utility of 197? Please provide a calculation.
Moral Hasard and Insurance The utility is U = W1/2 − 350S + 95S1/2 ; where W is wealth and S is care taken to avoid accidents. Probability of accident is 0.70 − S1/2 Wealth is ✩850,000 without accident and ✩300,000 with accident. Calculate S, EU and CE without insurance. Calculate S and EU with full insurance