3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Daniel and Gabrielle, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Daniel and Gabrielle can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 4.20 0 0 3.85 40 $154.00 3.50 80 $280.00 3.15 120 $378.00 2.80 160 $448.00 2.45 200 $490.00 2.10 240 $504.00 1.75 280 $490.00 1.40 320 $448.00 1.05 360 $378.00 0.70 400 $280.00 0.35 440 $154.00 0 480 0 Suppose Daniel and Gabrielle form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ output is per gallon, and the total gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Daniel and Gabrielle agree to split production equally. Therefore, Daniel's profit is and Gabrielle's profit is $

Principles of Microeconomics
7th Edition
ISBN:9781305156050
Author:N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw
Chapter15: Monopoly
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3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement
Consider a town in which only two residents, Daniel and Gabrielle, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Daniel and Gabrielle can pump and
sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water.
Price
(Dollars per gallon)
Quantity Demanded
Total Revenue
(Gallons of water)
(Dollars)
4.20
0
0
3.85
40
$154.00
3.50
80
$280.00
3.15
120
$378.00
2.80
160
$448.00
2.45
200
$490.00
2.10
240
$504.00
1.75
280
$490.00
1.40
320
$448.00
1.05
360
$378.00
0.70
400
$280.00
0.35
440
$154.00
0
480
0
Suppose Daniel and Gabrielle form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $
output is
per gallon, and the total
gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Daniel and Gabrielle agree to split production equally. Therefore, Daniel's profit is
and Gabrielle's profit is $
Transcribed Image Text:3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Daniel and Gabrielle, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Daniel and Gabrielle can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 4.20 0 0 3.85 40 $154.00 3.50 80 $280.00 3.15 120 $378.00 2.80 160 $448.00 2.45 200 $490.00 2.10 240 $504.00 1.75 280 $490.00 1.40 320 $448.00 1.05 360 $378.00 0.70 400 $280.00 0.35 440 $154.00 0 480 0 Suppose Daniel and Gabrielle form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ output is per gallon, and the total gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Daniel and Gabrielle agree to split production equally. Therefore, Daniel's profit is and Gabrielle's profit is $
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