3. Suppose that Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits are set according to the following rules: (i) minimum weekly earnings in last week of employment of $200.00 is needed to qualify; (ii) the maximum UI weekly benefit is $1000; and (iii) UI benefits are set equal to 50% of the last week's earnings between the minimum and maximum levels A. Show the structure of the UI benefit system on a diagram. B. Compute both the UI benefit level and the replacement rate if weekly earnings in the last week of employment is: (i) $100; (ii) $500; and (iii) $3,000.

3. Suppose that Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits are set according to the following rules: (i) minimum weekly earnings in last week of employment of $200.00 is needed to qualify; (ii) the maximum UI weekly benefit is $1000; and (iii) UI benefits are set equal to 50% of the last week's earnings between the minimum and maximum levels A. Show the structure of the UI benefit system on a diagram. B. Compute both the UI benefit level and the replacement rate if weekly earnings in the last week of employment is: (i) $100; (ii) $500; and (iii) $3,000.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter16: Labor Markets

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 16.3P

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Fringe benefits:a. As you might have suspected, employee nonwage (fringe) benefits make up a muchlarger percentage of labor costs in the United States today than they did a few generationsago (refer to Table 3.1 in the textbook). Fringe benefits as a form of labor compensationis also very unique to the U.S. and other developed nations. Do you think that thegrowing fringe benefit share of labor costs has made the level of employment moreresponsive or less responsive to changes in labor demand over the ups and downs in theoverall economy? In other words, has it given the employers of labor more or lessflexibility as they try to adapt to continuously changing economic conditions?
Suppose that Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits are set according to the following rules: (i) minimum weekly earnings in last week of employment of $200.00 is needed to qualify; (ii) the maximum UI weekly benefit is $1000; and (iii) UI benefits are set equal to 50% of the last week’s earnings between the minimum and maximum levels. A. Show the structure of the UI benefit system on a diagram. B. Compute both the UI benefit level and the replacement rate if weekly earnings in the last week of employment is: (i) $100; (ii) $500; and (iii) $3,000.
2. Assume that in the state of Kentucky, Bill is guaranteed S400 of welfare benefits if he does not work at all. They are allowed a disregard of $100 and face a tax rate of 50%. He has a nonlabor income equal to zero and if the works he can carn a wage of $10 per hour. His total time is 200 hours a woek. a. How many hours of leisure is Bill consuming at his break even point? b. Graph the budget constraint, labeling the break even point and other breaks in the curve as well as slopes of each line. Draw Bill's indifference curves such that he chooses to work 5 hours a month.
5. Suppose that John could work 365 days per year and could earn $200 per day for each day he worked. a. Draw his budget line with respect to his labor-leisure tradeoff b. Suppose that John chooses to work 200 days per year. Draw the appropriate indifference curve, and not his equilibrium wage income and labor-leisure choices c. Suppose that John’s wage rises to $210 per day. Show how his equilibrium level of income and labor-leisure will change. d. Suppose John is ill ten days per year. Draw the impact of this illness on the equilibrium above. How will it change his equilibrium allocation of earnings and labor vs. leisure?
Title 1. Suppose that the indifference curves between consumption and leisure are concave to the origin.... Description 1. Suppose that the indifference curves between consumption and leisure are concave to the origin. How many hours will a person allocate to leisure activities? 2. Suppose that the price of goods purchased in the marketplace rises. What is the impact of this price increase on the worker's reservation wage, on the worker's probability of entering the labor force, and on hours of work? 3. What happens to a worker's desired hours of work if employers pay an overtime premium equal to "time and a half'(that is, 1 .5 times the straight-time wage) for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours? What would happen to hours of work if the overtime premium were raised to double the straight-time wage?
1. A worker has $5000 of annual non-labor income. She has total available time of 80 hours per week, for 52*80 = 4160 hours per year. Her wage rate is $15 per hour and she currently chooses to allocate 2000 hours to work in a year. a. Illustrate her labor leisure diagram; using an Indifference Curve and budget line b. Using all the information above, label clearly all points on the graph: showing the optimal allocation of time and corresponding income
4. Assume that you are 18 years old and deciding whether to go to university or start working. If you work, you will earn a constant wage WHS throughout your career. If you study, you pay tuition for four years and then earn a constant wage WUNI. a. Show the condition under which you will choose to study. b. Explain how changes in tuition, interest rate, and wage differential (WUNI – WHS) would affect your decision.
Optimal unemployment insurance: Consider the following two proposals toreform unemployment insurance. Explain the arguments for and against eachreform.(a) Te insurance payment would be increased so that it replaced 100% of aworker’s regular labor income for 26 weeks.(b) Each worker would be paid a lump sum equal to 10 weeks of his or herlabor income at the start of the spell of unemployment. Tere would thenbe no other payments.
4. The different programs discussed in this chapter often have ambiguous effects on work effort. It is, nonetheless, possible to compare the work incentives of two programs by looking at what happens when the individual is indifferent between two programs. Use this approach to compare the work incentives of the following two pairs of programs: a. Earned income tax credit compared to welfare (discuss this only during the phase-in part of the EITC which would be the more likely scenario for an agent to be at risk of non-participating in the labor market). b. Wages subsidy compared to a negative income tax. In both cases, use graphs to show the hours of work chosen under the two programs by an individual who is indifferent between the two programs.
1. Zoe is trying to decide how to divide her time between her job as a wedding photographer, which pays $60 per hour for as many hours as she chooses to work, and as a rock collector, in which case her pay depends both on the price of the rocks and the number of them she finds. These are special rocks so they have value! Earnings aside, Zoe is indifferent between the two jobs. The number of rocks she can expect to find depends on the number of hours she searches: Hours per day Total rocks per day 0 0 1 7 2 13 3 17 4 20 5 21 The marginal cost of spending one hour hunting for rocks is $ . If the price per rock is $20 then the marginal benefit of spending one hour hunting for rocks is $ . If the price per rock is $20, she will spend at most hours hunting for rocks. If the price per rock falls to $10 then she will spend at most hours hunting for rocks.
Then consider an individual with the exact same preferences (same indifference curve map as in the previous question) and skills, but this person happened to have a better connection with a company and is earning a higher wage than the individual in part 'a'. Thus, this person faces budget line BL' below and takes l'hours of leisure (works T - l'hours). C 50 BL l' O Keep leisure the same T Then this individual is offered the same take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) cash grant of $g (that must be forgone if this person works at all). What would this individual do (in terms of leisure taken (and labor supplied))? O Take no leisure 151515 O Take more leisure, but not as much at T. ولا O Take all leisure (not work at all) O None of the other options.
ASAP Consider an income guarantee program with an income guarantess of $6000 and a benefit reductions rate of %50. A person can work up to 2000 hours per year $8 per hour. a. Draw the person’s budget constraint with the income guarantee. b. Suppose that the income gurantee rises to $9000 but with a 75% reduction rate. Draw the new budget constraint. c. Which of these two income guarantee programs is more likely to discourage Work? Explain.