4. A taproom owner is trying to determine how to structure his manager's compensation. One option he considers is a flat salary of $70,000 per year. The second option is a base salary of $30,000 plus 15% of the taproom's profit. If the manager puts a lot of effort into her job, the taproom's annual profit will be $500,000 with 75% probability and $100,000 with 25% probability. If the manager exerts only modest effort, the taproom's profit will be $500,000 with 25% probability and $100,000 with 75% probability. The manager's opportunity cost of putting a lot of effort into her job is $50,000, while her opportunity cost of exerting only modest effort is $25,000. a. Draw the game tree for the interaction. between the taproom owner and the manager. Assume that the taproom owner moves first. b. What is the equilibrium outcome for this game? What kind of contract should the taproom owner offer? What level of effort will the manager choose? Explain.

4. A taproom owner is trying to determine how to structure his manager's compensation. One option he considers is a flat salary of $70,000 per year. The second option is a base salary of $30,000 plus 15% of the taproom's profit. If the manager puts a lot of effort into her job, the taproom's annual profit will be $500,000 with 75% probability and $100,000 with 25% probability. If the manager exerts only modest effort, the taproom's profit will be $500,000 with 25% probability and $100,000 with 75% probability. The manager's opportunity cost of putting a lot of effort into her job is $50,000, while her opportunity cost of exerting only modest effort is $25,000. a. Draw the game tree for the interaction. between the taproom owner and the manager. Assume that the taproom owner moves first. b. What is the equilibrium outcome for this game? What kind of contract should the taproom owner offer? What level of effort will the manager choose? Explain.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.7P

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