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- Q2 Consider the following game. (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. 2, 4 6, 0 5,1 1,9 A ВExercise 6.8. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs: 1 R O player pay 000 2 1 M 3 b 010 O player 3's payoff 1 2 221 2 000 0 0 (a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Which ones are also subgame perfect? (b) [This is a more challenging question] Prove that there is no mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where Player 1 plays Mwith probability strictly between 0 and 1.2- Consider the following game. Player 2 Player 1 U 12, 2 | 3, 9 5, 8 4, 2 D (a) Find all the Nash equilibria, pure and mixed. (b) Suppose that the payoff of the column player u:(D, L) is reduced from 8 to 6, but all other payoffs remain the same. Again, find all the pure- and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. (c) Compare the mixed-strategy equilibria in parts (a) and (b). Did this worsening in one of player 2's payoffs change player 2's equilibrium mixed strategy? Did it change player l's? Give some intuition.
- In the following symmetric general sum game (2, 2) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (2, 2) (0,0) (2,2) (0,0) (i) Find all pure Nash equilibria. (ii) Find all mixed Nash equilibria in which all probabilities are positive. (vi) Which of these are evolutionary stable strategies?Which is false for the following game? C R. T. 3, 2 0,3 3, 3 M 5,0 4, 1 3, 1 B 2, 2 4, 5 1, 1 A. (M,C) and (B,C) are the only pure strategy Nash Equilibria OB. There is a Nash cquilibrium in which R is played with positive probability C. There is no Nash equilibrium in which L is played with positive probability OD. There is no Nash equilibrium in which both players choose two of their actions with positive probability8) Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the following normal form game. Player 2 T1 T2 T3 2, 3 3, 5 1, 1 Player 1 S2 1, 4 4, 3 0, 5 Player 1 attaches probability (S1, S2) = () and Player 2 attaches probability (T1, T2, T3) = ( ) Player 1 attaches probability (S1, S2) = (.) and Player 2 attaches probability (T1, T2, T3) = (qi, 42, 1 – q1 – 92) where q1 , and 0 < q2 S %3D Player 1 attaches probability (S1, S2) = (G,;) and Player 2 attaches probability (T1, T2, T1) = (qı.42, 1 – q1 – 42) where 0 < qi <, and q2 = 3. Player 1 attaches probability (S1, S) = (;, -) and player 2 attaches probability (T1, T2, T3) = (1.42, 1- q1- 42) where 0 s qı s and q2 =
- 9 00 3 -2 -8 A = ( ) and B = 03 -5 -2 Let I be the bimatrix game whose payoffs are described by A for the row-player and B for the column- player. 1. Compute all mixed Nash equilibria of T. 9Suppose now we alter the game so that whenever Colin chooses "paper" the loser pays the winner 3 instead of 1: rock paper scissors rock 0. -3 1 1. раper scissors -1 -1 3 (a) Show that xT= (,) and yT= (5) together are not a Nash equilibrium 3'31 for this modified 3'3 game. (b) Formulate a linear program that can be used to calculate a mixed strategy x € A(R) that maximises Rosemary's security level for this modified game. (c) Solve your linear program using the 2-phase simplex algorithm. You should use the format given in lectures. Give a mixed strategy x E A(R) that has an optimal security level for Rosemary and a mixed strategy y E A(C) that has an optimal security level for Colin.Consider the following two-player game with three options for each player. (Payouts are listed for the row player first, then the column player.) player Y layery 3,3 A 1,5 4,4 6,2 K 8,1 3,7 5,2 0,6 1,1 Find a mixed Nash equilibrium for this game. Solution suggestion: Use two variables per player. If p and are the probabilities of selecting the first two strategies, then 1-p-q is the probability of selecting the third strategy. You will need to solve a system of equations.
- Problem 2. Consider the partnership-game we discussed in Lecture 3 (pages 81-87 of the textbook). Now change the setup of the game so that player 1 chooses x = [0, 4], and after observing the choice of x, player 2 chooses y ≤ [0, 4]. The payoffs are the same as before. (a) Find all SPNE (subgame perfect Nash equilibria) in pure strategies. (b) Can you find a Nash equilibrium, with player 1 choosing x = 1, that is not subgame perfect? Explain.1.a) If the three executives of a fraudulent organization report nothing to the authorities, each gets a payoff of 100. If at least one of them blows the whistle, then those who reported the fraud get 28, while those who didn’t get -100. Suppose they play a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where each is silent (does not report fraud) with probability p. What is p?A, 0.1B, 0.28C, 0.5D, 0.8 b) In a two-player game, with strategies and (some known and some unknown) payoffs as shown below, suppose a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists where 1 plays C with probability 3/4, and Player 2 randomizes over X, Y, and Z with equal probabilities. What are the pure-strategy equilibria of this game? A, (A, Y) and (B, X)B, (A, Z) and (C, Y)C, (B, X) and (C, X)D, (C, X) and (C, Y)2. Army 1 of country 1 must decide whether to attack army 2 of country 2 which is occupying an island between the two countries (i.e. army 1 moves first). In the event of an attack, army 2 may fight or retreat over a bridge to its mainland. Each army prefers to occupy the island than not to occupy it; a fight is the worst outcome for both armies. (a) Model the situation as an extensive form game with perfect information. Find a Nash Equilibrium of this game which is not subgame perfect. (b) Find the only Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium and compare with the equilibrium in the previous question. (c) Assume now that army 2 has the possibility of burning the bridge to its mainland. If it does, army 2 would then not be able to retreat if army 1 attacked. i. Write down the extensive form of this game. Show that army 2 can increase its payoff in a Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium in the new game. Interpret what this fact illustrates. ii. iii. Now assume that the attacking army cannot observe…