9. Suppose a firm is collecting $100 in total revenues when it sells 10 units and it receives $110 intotal revenues when it sells 11 units. The firm is a(n)A) pure monopolist.B) oligopolist.C) monopolistic competitor.10. Which of the following circumstances does not involve game theory?A) A local gas station owner wondering how his competition across the street will react tohis decision to lower prices.D) monopsonist.E) perfect competitor.B) Negotiating a salary when two firms have made offers.C) Deciding whether to have an extramarital affair.D) Firm behavior in a perfectly competitive market.E) Playing poker.11. Implicit costsA) are always fixed.B) appear in the calculation of accounting profits.C) measure the forgone opportunities of the owners of the business.D) always exceed explicit costs.E) are irrelevant to business decisions.12. Suppose all firms in a perfectly competitive industry are experiencing economic profits. Onecan hypothesize thatA) market supply will decrease.B) the number of firms will rise.C) market demand will increase.13. Marginal utility is defined as theD) market price will rise.E) quantity supplied will increase.A) additional utility gained by consuming an extra unit of a good.B) total utility from all units consumed of a good.C) average utility gained by consuming an average amount of the good.D) total utility gained by consuming an extra unit of a good.E) change in quantity divided by the change in utility.14. When all buyers have identical demand curves, we can get the market demand curve byA) adding their quantity demanded verticallyB) multiplying each quantity by the number of consumersC) adding all the prices first than adding all the quantity demandedD) adding each consumers utilityE) multiplying each consumers utility by the number of consumers

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9. Suppose a firm is collecting $100 in total revenues when it sells 10 units and it receives $110 in total revenues when it sells 11 units. The firm is a(n) A) pure monopolist. B) oligopolist. C) monopolistic competitor. D) monopsonist. E) perfect competitor.

9. Suppose a firm is collecting $100 in total revenues when it sells 10 units and it receives $110 in total revenues when it sells 11 units. The firm is a(n) A) pure monopolist. B) oligopolist. C) monopolistic competitor. D) monopsonist. E) perfect competitor.

Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9PA

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