2. SPENCE'S LABOR SIGNALING. Suppose there are 2 types of workers, high productivity (H) and low-productivity (L). Each can choose to purchase years of college education, y, but the costs are higher for the L's than the H's. For example, the L's may buy more study guides and hire more tutors, take more time and energy to complete assignments, and otherwise face higher personal costs. Suppose CH[y] = $5,000y and C'[y] = $7,500y. Suppose an employer offers to pay $25,000 to any worker who has a 4-year college degree, but nothing for workers without degrees. Determine how much education each type of worker chooses. In other words, do the math to compute the net-benefit-maximizing education levels y#* and yl*. TIP: You have two cost functions, you know the benefit function is “Pay nothing when y < 4, but pay $25,000 when y 24," and you know each type of worker tries to maximize its net benefits = benefits – costs. TIP: The only two interesting levels of education are y=0 and y=4. а.

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2. SPENCE'S LABOR SIGNALING. Suppose there are 2 types of workers, high productivity (H) and
low-productivity (L). Each can choose to purchase years of college education, y, but the costs are
higher for the L's than the H's. For example, the L's may buy more study guides and hire more tutors,
take more time and energy to complete assignments, and otherwise face higher personal costs.
Suppose CH[y] = $5,000y and C'[y] = $7,500y.
Suppose an employer offers to pay $25,000 to any worker who has a 4-year college degree, but
nothing for workers without degrees. Determine how much education each type of worker
chooses. In other words, do the math to compute the net-benefit-maximizing education levels y#*
and yl*. TIP: You have two cost functions, you know the benefit function is “Pay nothing when y
< 4, but pay $25,000 when y 24," and you know each type of worker tries to maximize its net
benefits = benefits – costs. TIP: The only two interesting levels of education are y=0 and y=4.
а.
Transcribed Image Text:2. SPENCE'S LABOR SIGNALING. Suppose there are 2 types of workers, high productivity (H) and low-productivity (L). Each can choose to purchase years of college education, y, but the costs are higher for the L's than the H's. For example, the L's may buy more study guides and hire more tutors, take more time and energy to complete assignments, and otherwise face higher personal costs. Suppose CH[y] = $5,000y and C'[y] = $7,500y. Suppose an employer offers to pay $25,000 to any worker who has a 4-year college degree, but nothing for workers without degrees. Determine how much education each type of worker chooses. In other words, do the math to compute the net-benefit-maximizing education levels y#* and yl*. TIP: You have two cost functions, you know the benefit function is “Pay nothing when y < 4, but pay $25,000 when y 24," and you know each type of worker tries to maximize its net benefits = benefits – costs. TIP: The only two interesting levels of education are y=0 and y=4. а.
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