Assume that the market demand and the costs of the duopolists are: P=120-0.4(QA + QB) TCA=5QA TCB= 0.2Q2B Also assume that firm B is the sophisticated leader, Determine: a. The reaction curve of A ,the reaction curve of B and the profit function of A b. Stackelberg equilibrium output level for firm A and Stackelberg equilibrium output level for firm B c. The market price
Q: Consider a Stackelberg duopoly in which firm 1 sets q. firm 2 observes q, and then chooses q a. Firm…
A: The market is a location where the transaction of services and commodities takes place. It is…
Q: Duopolists following the Cournot strategy face a market demand curve given by P 90 - 2Q where Q is…
A: Since you have asked multiple questions, we will provide a solution for the first one. As it is a…
Q: The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P= 24,000 -5Q. The cost…
A: Here we calculate the following terms by using the given information , and fill the blanks so the…
Q: Consider an infinitely repeated Bertrand oligopoly game with discount factor æ>1. The unite cost of…
A:
Q: If the manager cannot identify to which group his customers belong, what is the uniform monopoly…
A: In part (a) determine uniform monopoly price, if market cannot be segmented. Here, it is given that…
Q: Duopolists following the Cournot strategy face a market demand curve given by P = 90 - 2Q where Q is…
A: We’ll answer the first question since the exact one wasn’t specified. Please submit a new question…
Q: Question 10 A monopolistie producer of two goods, G and G2, has a joint total cost function TC = 5Q,…
A: Economics as a subject deals with the allocation of scarce resources among humans with unlimited…
Q: 1. The cost function for any potential firm in a manufacturing industry is C(y) = 2 + 8y + 2y2 (if a…
A: Answer-
Q: 1. Suppose the duopolists producing homogeneous products face the following market demand curve and…
A: A market is the collection of buyers and sellers in which they exchange goods and services in terms…
Q: Two Bistro restaurants, Bistro 1 and Bistro 2, have demand functions for meals defined as Q1 = 44 –…
A: definition: The demand function addresses the connection between the demanded quantity for an item…
Q: The market for dark chocolate us characterized by Cournot duopolists - Honeydukes and Wonka…
A: In a Cournot Duopoly, there are just 2 firms and each firm chooses its output thinking that the…
Q: To examine the effects of a subsidy, consider the large passenger jetliners market with two firms…
A: Cournot's model is an example of an oligopoly industry in which firms are assumed to determine their…
Q: Suppose you are employed at a monopolistic company as a research (pricing) economist and you are…
A: The demand for the first market is given as follows: The demand for the second market is given as…
Q: Consider a market with a duopolist structure. Each firm has similar marginal costs. Based on this…
A: In the Cournot duopoly model, both firms determine the profit-maximizing quantity simultaneously.…
Q: Duopolists following the Cournot strategy face a market demand curve given by P= 90 - 2Q where Q is…
A: P = 90 - 2Q P = 90 - 2(q1+q2) where Q = q1+q2 MC = 40 per unit
Q: Consider a setting of two competing firms F1 and F2. Both firms maximize their profits and provide a…
A:
Q: Assume that two companies (A and B) are duopolists who produce identical products. Demand for the…
A: As per our policy, we'll solve the first three subparts. Kindly repost the question to get answers…
Q: A nightclub manager realizes that demand for drinks is more elastic among students, and is trying to…
A: Average demands: Under 25: qr = 18 − 5p Over 25: q = 10 − 2p Marginal costs = $2
Q: Suppose one family enjoys a monopoly in the market for Product X. The demand for Product X is P 140…
A: We know that firm achives equilibrium condition where MC= MR . Where firm makes maximum profit.
Q: Consider two identical firms with similar cost functions given by C, = cq, and C2 = cq2. The inverse…
A: Quasi-competitive model can be defined as the pricing model in oligopoly market where each of the…
Q: Suppose firms A, B, and C set prices while facing per-period demand of Q = 200 - P, which yields a…
A: TheBertrand model is a competition model which is used in economics . In this model the firm set…
Q: Two firms both produce leather boots. The inverse demand equation is given by P = 280 Q, where Pis…
A: Given: Price = 280 - Q C(q) = 40 Q
Q: Assume a market consists of two upstream firms, and they are sole suppliers of their respective…
A: Vertical integration is a strategy where a company either owns or controls its…
Q: Suppose a duopoly in a market for a differentiated good. The demands and costs of the two companies,…
A: We have Bertrand price model where two firms are decided their price simultaneous.
Q: Consider two firms 1 and 2. The cost function of each firm is TC(9) - function is given by P(Q) = 40…
A: price = 40-QQ= q1+q2=40-(q1+q2)TC1=90q1TC2=90q2Computing MR for both the firms…
Q: The market demand curve for a pair of Bertrand duopolists is given as P= 34 - 3Q, where Q= Q+ Q2 The…
A: Given P = 34 – 3q Q = q1 + q2 Marginal cost = 16
Q: The market for management consulting services is a Stackelberg duopoly. Alvarez Inc. acts as the…
A: We have two firms with equal marginal and average costs
Q: A company has a monopoly on themed vacations. It has two kinds of clients. After extensive market…
A: Given Marginal Cost (MC) = $16 For Americans Q = 50 - P (The demand function) P = 50 - Q In 2…
Q: Gamma and Zeta are the only two widget manufacturers in the world. Each firm has a cost function…
A: We have here:- Total cost=TC=10+10q+q2 Inverse demand function=P=100-Q=100-q1-q2 marginal…
Q: The market inverse demand curve for thrust bearings is P = 15 - 1.5Q, where Q is measured in…
A: Answer; Option (c) is correct
Q: Question 2 In a recent strategy meeting, the Chief Operating Officer (COO) had asked you to report…
A: In Cournot duopoly, two firms compete in quantity and maximize profit by producing where their…
Q: A monopolistic producer of two goods, G1 and G2, has a total cost function TC = 5Q1 + 10Q2 where…
A: A monopolist maximizes its profits when the marginal revenue earned from the sale of an additional…
Q: Consider a market where 2 firms compete a la Bertrand. Market demand is q(pmin) = 12 - pmin» and…
A: To check the statements provided in the question we need to formulate a game with these two firms…
Q: The market inverse demand curve is P = 60 –Q. The three firms in this industry are acting like a…
A: here we calculate the change in profit of the firm by using the given information , so the…
Q: 1) Two firms produce goods that are imperfect substitutes. If firm 1 charges price p1 and firm 2…
A: Demand function for firm 1 : q1 = 12 - 2p1 + p2 Demand function for firm 2 : q2 = 12 + p1 - 2p2…
Q: Tom is a monopolist input supplier to Dick and Harry. Tom's marginal cost is 1. Dick and Harry are…
A: The maximum revenue/profit that a producer can possibly earn is analyzed given a certain price,…
Q: What is the follower’s total revenue function? Determine the equilibrium output level for both the…
A: Since you have posted a question with multiple sub-parts, we will solve first three subparts for…
Q: For Company A, the long-run equilibrium output is and the selling price is $ .…
A:
Q: Assume both firm 1 and firm 2 are in the market and act as oligopolists. Assume furthermore that…
A: In Bertrand competition, firms charges price of its product simultaneously.
Q: The market demand curve faced by Cournot duopolistsis: Qd = 400 - 8P where Qd is the market quantity…
A: Qd = 400 - 8P 8P = 400 - Q P =(400 - Q) / 8 P = 50 - 0.125Q The demand function : P = 50 - 0.125Q
Q: Two firms produce goods that are imperfect substitutes. If firm 1 charges price p1 and firm 2…
A: Demand function for firm 1 : q1 = 12 - 2p1 + p2 Demand function for firm 2 : q2 = 12 + p1 - 2p2…
Q: Suppose that two firms produce a particular (homogeneous) product. The inverse demand function for…
A: Answer- Given in the question- P = 100 -Q Q = Q1 + Q2 Q1 = Quantity of Firm 1 Q2 = Quantity of Firm…
Q: Suppose that firms' marginal and average costs are constant and equal to c and that inverse market…
A: Given, Firm marginal cost and average cost, MC = AC = c The demand function, P= a- b Q A monopoly…
Q: Suppose that firms’ marginal and average costs are constant and equal to c and that inverse market…
A: "Since you have posted a question with multiple subparts, we will solve the first three subparts for…
Q: 1. Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P =…
A: In the monopoly market structure, there is a single seller selling a unique product in the market.…
Q: Suppose the inverse demand function for two Cournot dupolists is given by P= 10 – (Q1+Q2) and their…
A: Given, The inverse demand function, P = 10 – (Q1+Q2) P = 10 –Q1 – Q2 Total cost= TC = MC =0 a) Total…
Q: Two Bistro restaurants, Bistro 1 and Bistro 2, have demand functions for meals defined as Q1 = 44 –…
A: Answer is given below
Q: • Question #21: Consider a Leader-Follower duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb…
A: Note: “Since you have asked multiple question, we will solve the first question for you. If you want…
Q: Two firms both produce leather boots. The inverse demand equation is given by P = 280 Q, where Pis…
A: According to the question, there are 2 firms in oligopoly and creating the Bertrand model. Let say…
Assume that the market demand and the costs of the duopolists are:
P=120-0.4(QA + QB)
TCA=5QA
TCB= 0.2Q2B
Also assume that firm B is the sophisticated leader, Determine:
a. The reaction curve of A ,the reaction curve of B and the profit function of A
b. Stackelberg equilibrium output level for firm A and Stackelberg equilibrium output level for firm B
c. The market price
Trending now
This is a popular solution!
Step by step
Solved in 6 steps
- Consider any market that has a demand curve given by: Qd = 240 - 2P. Where Qd is the total quantity demanded in the market, given in millions of units and P is the market price, calculated in monetary units. Imagine that there are 2 Cournot oligopolists operating in this market with Cmg = CVme = 15 and fixed monthly costs equal to 1,400. About this market, ask yourself: a) What is the reaction curve of oligopolists? b) What will be the production of each of the companies? c) What is the selling price practiced by oligopolists? d) What is the profit of each of the oligopolists? e) Imagine that one of the companies managed to implement a process innovation capable of halving its Cmg and CVme, so that they would go from 15 to 7.5. This investment implies an additional monthly expense of $1,800. Discuss the statement: "If this situation occurs, the innovative company will not implement variable cost reduction, as the quantity supplied in the market will increase very little; prices will…(a) Firms A and B are Cournot duopolists producing a homogeneous good. The inverse market demand is given by P= 100 Q, where P is the market price and Q is the total quantity demanded. Each firm has marginal cost equal to 40 and there are no fixed costs. Calculate the total industry output in this market. Derive also (i) the market price, the total profit of the two firms and the consumer surplus. (ii) monopoly. Calculate the total industry output after the merger. Derive also the market price, profit and consumer surplus after the merger. Explain intuitively any changes in these variables if the merger occurs. Suppose the two firms propose to merge to become aQ3. There are two firms selling differentiated products. Firm A faces the following demand for his product: e, = 20 – -P, + -P, 2. Firm B faces the following demand: 1 P. +-P, 2. 0, = 220- Assume that the marginal cost is zero both for firm A and firm B. What are the equilibrium prices of a simultaneous price competition? What would the equilibrium prices be if A is the leader and B is the follower?
- Suppose you are employed at a monopolistic company as a research (pricing) economist and you are deriving the behavior of two markets based on demand curves given by: Di(P1) 3 50 — Pі D:(p>) — 50 — 2р2 Assume that the marginal cost is constant at $8 a unit. (a) If it can price discriminate, what price should it charge in each market in order to maximize profits? (b) If it can't price discriminate, what price should it charge?Tom is a monopolist input supplier to Dic and Harry. Tom's marginal cost is 1. Dic and Harry are duopolists with production function q = x1/2. No firm has fixed costs. The demand for the final product is given by Q = 100 – p. a) Assume Dic and Harry buy the input from Tom at price k. What are their cost functions? b) Find the Cournot equilibrium quantities. c) What price, k, should Tom set? -2. Stackelberg Firms 1, 2 and 3 compete in quantities. The inverse market demand is given by p = 400 (91 +92 +93), where 91, 92 and q3 are the quantities produced by firms 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The marginal cost for firm 1 is c₁ = 20, and the marginal cost for both firm 2 and firm 3 is 40. The order of play is as follows: Firm 1 first sets a quantity q₁. Then, firms 2 and 3 observe q₁ and simultaneously set q2 and 93. Each firm sets its quantity to maximize its own profits. (a) Let us first consider the optimal action of firm 2. Given a value q₁ initially set by firm 1 and a value of q3 set by firm 3, what is the value of q2 that maximizes the profits of firm 2? Hint: Your answer should provide q2 in terms of 91 and 93. (b) Notice that, after firm 1 sets q1, a subgame starts, in which firms 2 and 3 simultaneously set q2 and 93. Given 91, find the values of q2 and q3 that firms 2 and 3 must set in a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Hint: Your answer should provide q2 and q3 in…
- Question 2: A market is contested by two firms, A and B, who compete in selling a homoge- neous good. Market demand is given by Q = 240 3p, where p is the price of the good. Firm A has constant marginal costs of 20 as long as it produces 100 units or fewer. Every unit above 100 costs 75 to produce. Firm B has the cost function CB = Q3, where QB is the quantity produced by firm B. The firms sequentially choose prices. A is the market leader and chooses its price first; B chooses its price after observing A's price. If they charge the same price each sells half of the demand at that price. The firms cannot turn away customers. What is the equilibrium price in this industry?QUESTION THREE The market demand faced by duopolists is given by P=100-0.4Q and their respective cost functions are C1=5Q1,and C2=0.1Q22 where, Q1 and Q2 are quantities produced and supplied by duopolists 1 and 2 respectively so that Q= Q1+Q2 Derive the reaction equations Calculate quantity of the leader duopolist, Firm 1 Calculate quantity of the followerSuppose two firms engage in simultaneous quantity competition. Both firms have 0marginal cost. Firm A : P(Q)= 24-Q Firm B: P(Q)= 24-2Q a) Find the Nash Equilibrium quantities q^NE and profits.(b) Find the Monopoly Quantity QM and Profit.(c) Now suppose the game is repeated infinitely and each firm has a common discountfactor δ. Find the required discount factor to sustain the following grim triggerstrategy as a SPNE: Play Q^M /2 if this has been played in every previous period,otherwise play q^NE.
- 1. The cost function for any potential firm in a manufacturing industry is C(y) = 2 + 8y + 2y? (if a firm exits the industry, then its cost is zero). The inverse market demand function is given by P(y) = 100 – 2y. (c) If the government wants to limit the number of firms to 5 in this industry by issuing only 5 licenses (all the firms are Cournot oligopolists), what is the highest price that the government can charge for the license?Consider any market that has a demand curve given by: Qd = 240 - 2P. Where Qd is the total quantity demanded in the market, given in millions of units and P is the market price, calculated in monetary units. Imagine that there are 2 Cournot oligopolists operating in this market with Cmg = CVme = 15 and fixed monthly costs equal to 1,400. About this market, ask yourself: a) What is the profit of each of the oligopolists? b) Imagine that one of the companies managed to implement a process innovation capable of halving its Cmg and CVme, so that they would go from 15 to 7.5. This investment implies an additional monthly expense of $1,800. Discuss the statement: "If this situation occurs, the innovative company will not implement variable cost reduction, as the quantity supplied in the market will increase very little; prices will remain very close to what they are today and its profits will not increase"Suppose that firms’ marginal and average costs are constant and equal to c and that inverse market demand is given by P = a – bQ, where a, b > 0 (a) Calculate the profit-maximizing quantity-price combination and for a monopolist. (b) Calculate the Nash equilibrium quantities for Cournot duopolists, which choose quantities and for their identical products simultaneously. Also compute market output and market price. (c) Calculate the perfectly competitive equilibrium price and market output. (d) Suppose now that there are n identical firms in a Cournot model (oligopoly). Compute the Nash equilibrium quantities as functions of n. Also compute market output and market price. (e) Verify (i) that the monopoly outcome from part (a) can be reproduced in part (d) by setting n = 1; (ii) that the duopoly outcome from part (b) can be reproduced in part (d) by setting n = 2; (iii) that letting n approach infinity yields the same market price and output as…