Consider a Stackelberg game played by 3 firms: firm 1 moves first, then firm 2, and finally firm 3. Inverse demand is p = 11 - Q where Q = 91 +92 +93. All firms face the same constant marginal costs c = 1. Identify the SPE of this game.

Consider a Stackelberg game played by 3 firms: firm 1 moves first, then firm 2, and finally firm 3. Inverse demand is p = 11 - Q where Q = 91 +92 +93. All firms face the same constant marginal costs c = 1. Identify the SPE of this game.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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