Firm A currently dumps 223 tons of chemicals into the local river. Firm B currently dumps 192 tons of chemicals into the local river. The government has decided to reduce the pollution and from now on will require a pollution permit for each ton of pollution dumped into the river. The government gives each firm 10 pollution permits. The abatement costs of one ton of pollution is $173 for Firm A and $76 for Firm B. What would be the total cost of reducing pollution, if the firms are allowed to trade permits between each other?

Firm A currently dumps 223 tons of chemicals into the local river. Firm B currently dumps 192 tons of chemicals into the local river. The government has decided to reduce the pollution and from now on will require a pollution permit for each ton of pollution dumped into the river. The government gives each firm 10 pollution permits. The abatement costs of one ton of pollution is $173 for Firm A and $76 for Firm B. What would be the total cost of reducing pollution, if the firms are allowed to trade permits between each other?

Microeconomics

13th Edition

ISBN:9781337617406

Author:Roger A. Arnold

Publisher:Roger A. Arnold

Chapter17: Market Failure: Externalities, Public Goods, And Asymmetric Information

Section17.3: Environmental Policy

Problem 1ST

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