5. (b) Are the following statements true or false? Justify your answer (simply saying true or false will carry no credit). i) "A labor market dominated by a single buyer achieves Pareto efficiency if the buyer operates as a perfectly discriminating monopolist". ii) "A cake is divided between two individuals; Pareto optimality requires that they receive equal shares".

5. (b) Are the following statements true or false? Justify your answer (simply saying true or false will carry no credit). i) "A labor market dominated by a single buyer achieves Pareto efficiency if the buyer operates as a perfectly discriminating monopolist". ii) "A cake is divided between two individuals; Pareto optimality requires that they receive equal shares".

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter16: Bargaining

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 16.1IP

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

City-wide lockdowns were implemented in Sydney by the NSW government in July-August 2021 in response to new COVID-19 cases detected in the community. This question assumes that the market for apartments in Sydney is perfectly competitive.(a) Evaluate the decision of the NSW government to double the first home buyer subsidy in terms of Pareto efficiency and fairness.(b) Now suppose the NSW government decides not to help first home buyers in Sydney any longer and removes the existing subsidy. Evaluate this decision in terms of Pareto efficiency and fairness.
20. Comparing the Cournot model to the Bertrand model with homogenous goods, which of the following statements is true? (a) The Cournot outcome leads to lower equilibrium prices. (b) Higher consumer surplus is delivered under the Bertrand model. (c) The Bertrand model predicts more entry than the Cournot model. (d) Collusion on prices is much easier than collusion on quantities. (e) None of the above.
(A) Suppose that the two firms merge. Write down the profit function of the merged firm. Calculate the profit maximizing level of output, the amount of pollution for the merged firm, and its profit. Is the merger Pareto improvement? Why or why not? (B) Suppose that the merger is forbidden by the government. Instead, now the fishery has the property right to water. In other words, anybody who wants to pollute the water needs to buy a pollution right from the fishery. Let the price of the pollution right be Px. Write down the steel mill’s new profit function and the fishery’s new profit function. (C) Calculate the profit maximizing level of output for each firm, the amount of pollution, and the price of pollution right. please, please answer the three questions together..
34. Which one would have the greatest effect
1. when consent is given, the individual is held to this concern even if here she did not fully understand what was being consented to. True or false
(a) Consider the following games which are commonly used in laboratory exper- iments on social preferences. For each: describe the game, explain how the game would be played by selfish players and summarise the main findings from the experimental evidence. i. Dictator game ii. Ultimatum bargaining game iii. Trust game (b) Carefully comment on the figure below, which shows the percentage of third parties who punish in the dictator game and is taken from Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), "Third party punishment and social norms", Evolution and Human Behavior 25(2).. Percentage of punishers E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher/ Evolution and Human Behavior 25 (2004) 63-87 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 A percentage of third parties who punish --percentage of recipients who belief that third parties punish 0 10 20 30 Dictator's transfer to recipient Fig. 1. Percentage of third parties who punished in the dictator game. 40 50 (c) Explain why anonymity of the subjects is an important feature of public good…
(a) Consider the following games which are commonly used in laboratory exper- iments on social preferences. For each: describe the game, explain how the game would be played by selfish players and summarise the main findings from the experimental evidence. i. Dictator game ii. Ultimatum bargaining game iii. Trust game (b) Carefully comment on the figure below, which shows the percentage of third parties who punish in the dictator game and is taken from Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), "Third party punishment and social norms", Evolution and Human Behavior 25(2). [10 marks] Percentage of punishers E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher/ Evolution and Human Behavior 25 (2004) 63-87 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 A percentage of third parties who punish --percentage of recipients who belief that third parties punish 0 10 20 30 Dictator's transfer to recipient Fig. 1. Percentage of third parties who punished in the dictator game. 40 50 (c) Explain why anonymity of the subjects is an important feature of…
Back to Assignment Attempts 2. Individual Problems 14-2 Keep the Highest /2 A local Pilates studio recently began offering a monthly subscription service for its patrons. Suppose a particular patron at this studio has the following willingness-to-pay schedule, per session. Session Willingness to Pay 1st $70 2nd $60 3rd $50 4th $40 5th $30 6th $20 Suppose this consumer would not demand any more sessions, even for free. Also assume that the marginal cost to the studio, per session, is constant at $10. At a price of $55.00 per session, the number of sessions demanded by this consumer would be is $ and producer surplus is 2. At this price and quantity, consumer surplus Suppose the studio has devised a new pricing scheme for consumers who demand more than 1 session. This pricing scheme is a subscription service, whereby consumers can pay a flat fee of $202.50 and can have up to 6 sessions total. Using this subscription pricing model, this consumer would demand producer surplus is S total…
16. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is: (a) A process for solving dynamic games by starting at the end and working backwards. (b) A solution concept used in dynamic games of complete information. (c) A method for finding the optimal strategy in a dynamic game. (d) An outcome of a dynamic game which is Pareto optimal. (e) All of the above.
a) How many players does this game have? What are the strategies of each player? (b) What are the Nash equilibria of this game? (c) What are the Pareto Efficient outcomes?
The definition of Game Theory is: Game Theory is a field of mathematics that analyzes strategic-interaction between rational, self-interested players. Give an example of a situation that can be considered a game from the perspective of game theory. You can choose this example from your experience or you can consider a hypothetical scenario. Use your own imagination and make sure this is not any famous or known example used in game theory. 1. What is happening in this game? 2. Who are the players in this game? 3. What are the possible actions for each player? 4. Represent the game in normal form with the utilities you have mentioned in the description of the game. 5. Justify the utilities you have assigned. 6. Find the best responses of each player.
1) Your firm must decide whether or not to introduce a new product. If you introduce the new product, your rival will have to decide whether or not to clone it. If you don't introduce the new product, you and your rival will earn $1million each. If you introduce the new product and your rival clones it, you will lose $5million and your rival will gain $20 million (you have spent a lot on R&D and your rival will not have to spend any R&D in order to clone it). If you introduce the new product and your rival does not clone, you will make $100million and your rival will make $0. a) Draw the extensive form (the tree diagram) of this game, carefully labeling each node and outcomes associated with each action. b) Should you introduce the new product? c) How would your answer change if your rival has "promised" not to clone your product? d) What would you do if patent law prevented your rival from cloning your product?