o evaluate the impact of a specific business merger, economists tend to measure wh nerger has O made much difference. O all of the above. O hurt consumers. O helped consumers. na market economy, a regulator representing the government would probably assign tl Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, HHI, estimate to one of these four answers. Which one? O an oligopoly O a perfect competitor O a monopoly O a monopolistic competitor ne of these four answers represents a challenge relating to environmental command a gulations. Which one? O obvious lack of loopholes

o evaluate the impact of a specific business merger, economists tend to measure wh nerger has O made much difference. O all of the above. O hurt consumers. O helped consumers. na market economy, a regulator representing the government would probably assign tl Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, HHI, estimate to one of these four answers. Which one? O an oligopoly O a perfect competitor O a monopoly O a monopolistic competitor ne of these four answers represents a challenge relating to environmental command a gulations. Which one? O obvious lack of loopholes

Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9PA

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Similar questions

When OPEC raised the price of oil dramatically in the mid-1970s, experts said it was unlikely that the cartel could stay together over the long term-that the incentives for individual members. to cheat would become too strong. More than fort),r years later, OPEC still exists. Why do you think OPEC has been able to beat the odds and continue to collude? Hint: You may wish to consider non-economic reasons.
Imagine a monopolist could charge a different price to every customer based on how much he or she were willing to pay. How would this affect monopoly profits?
Is it true that the four-firm concentration ratio puts more emphasis on one or two very large films, while the Herfindahl-Hirshmau Index puts more emphasis on all the films in the entire market? Explain briefly.
Sometimes oligopolies in the same industry are very different in size. Suppose we have a duopoly where one firm (Film A) is large and the other film (Film B) is small, as the prisoners dilemma box in Table 10.4 shows. Assuming that both films know the payoffs, what is the likely outcome in this case?
If the firms in a monopolistically competitive market are earning economic profits or losses in the short run, would you expect them to continue doing so in the long run? Why?
Consider the curve in the figure below, which shows the market demand. marginal cost, and marginal revenue curve for firms in an oligopolistic industry. In this example, we assume firms have zero fixed costs. Suppose the firms collude to form a cartel. What price will the cartel charge? What quantity will the cartel supply? How much profit will the cartel earn? Suppose now that the cane] breaks up and the oligopolistic firms compete as vigorously as possible by cutting the price and increasing sales. What will be the industry quantity and price? What will be the collective profits of all firms in the industry? Compare the equilibrium price, quantity, and profit for the cartel and cutthroat competition outcomes.
How can a monopolist identify the profit-maximizing level of output if it knows its total revenue and total cost curves?
How does the demand curve perceived by a monopolist compare with the market demand curve?
Continuing with the scenario in question 1, in the long run, the positive economic profits that the monopolistic competitor earns will attract a response either from existing firms in the industry or film outside. As those films capture the original films profit, what will happen to the original films profit-maximizing price and output levels?