Please answer all parts and do not use ChatGPT or other AI tools. Please give me the solution and specific answers. Thanks! PROBLEM (1) Firms 1 and 2 have total cost functions TC₁(q) = q² and TC₂ (q)(with MC₁(q) = 2q2q=¹) respectively. They are competing in quantities in a market with (inverse) demand p3and MC₂ (9)630 - 2Q.==Determine the market price in each of the following market organization scenarios:(a) [C] Cournot-Nash equilibrium They are competing in Cournot competition.(b) [S] Stackelberg Equilibrium As in (a), but A is the leader and chooses the quantity first (and B choosesher quantity afterwards, observing A's choice).(c) [M] Collusion They collude as in a cartel, to maximize joint profits.(d) [P] Perfect Competition Benchmark: They behave perfectly competitively, as price takers.(e) Calculate the DWL (dead-weight loss, inefficiency) in the Stackelberg equilibrium in (b) (WARNING:tedious calculations!)(f) (MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTION: NO calculation/explanation needed!) Which of the following6 market arrangements below ...(i) Firm 1 operates as a monopoly (Firm 2 doesn't exist at all)(ii) Firm 1 operates as a perfectly competitive firm (as a price taker!) (Firm 2 doesn't exist at all)(iii) Firm 2 operates as a monopoly (Firm 1 doesn't exist at all)(iv) Firm 2 operates as a perfectly competitive firm (as a price taker!) (Firm 1 doesn't exist at all)(v) Firm 1 and Firm 2 collude (Scenario (c) above)(vi) Firm 1 and Firm 2 operate as perfectly competitive firms as price takers (Scenario (d) above)maximizes TS?maximizes PS ?minimizes CS?

The cost function defines the relationship between two variables i.e. the inputs and their prices.…

PROBLEM (1) Firms 1 and 2 have total cost functions TC₁(q) = q² and TC₂ (q) = ²/3 (with MC₁(q) = 2q and MC₂ (q) =) respectively. They are competing in quantities in a market with (inverse) demand p = 630 - 20. Determine the market price in each of the following market organization scenarios: (a) [C] Cournot-Nash equilibrium They are competing in Cournot competition. (b) [S] Stackelberg Equilibrium As in (a), but A is the leader and chooses the quantity first (and B chooses her quantity afterwards, observing A's choice). (c) [M] Collusion They collude as in a cartel, to maximize joint profits.

PROBLEM (1) Firms 1 and 2 have total cost functions TC₁(q) = q² and TC₂ (q) = ²/3 (with MC₁(q) = 2q and MC₂ (q) =) respectively. They are competing in quantities in a market with (inverse) demand p = 630 - 20. Determine the market price in each of the following market organization scenarios: (a) [C] Cournot-Nash equilibrium They are competing in Cournot competition. (b) [S] Stackelberg Equilibrium As in (a), but A is the leader and chooses the quantity first (and B chooses her quantity afterwards, observing A's choice). (c) [M] Collusion They collude as in a cartel, to maximize joint profits.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.3P

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