Three products compete in a market and their demand and supply functions are qd1 = 44-2p1+p2+p3 qs1 = -10+3p1 qd2 = 25+ p1 –p2 +3p3 qs2 = -15+5p2 qd3 = 40 +2p1+p2 -3p3 qs3 = -18+2p3 where p1, p2, and p3 are the prices. Determine the prices and quantities which result in equilibrium in each market using Cramer’s rule.
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- Three products compete in a market and their demand and supply functions are
qd1 = 44-2p1+p2+p3 qs1 = -10+3p1
qd2 = 25+ p1 –p2 +3p3 qs2 = -15+5p2
qd3 = 40 +2p1+p2 -3p3 qs3 = -18+2p3
where p1, p2, and p3 are the prices. Determine the prices and quantities which result in equilibrium in each market using Cramer’s rule.
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