Which one of the following statements is incorrect? A. A finite static game with complete information may not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. B. For dynamic games with complete information, not all subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points can be found by backward induction. C. A finite static game with complete information cannot have an extensive form representation. D. A finite dynamic game with complete information may also have a normal form representation.

Which one of the following statements is incorrect? A. A finite static game with complete information may not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. B. For dynamic games with complete information, not all subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points can be found by backward induction. C. A finite static game with complete information cannot have an extensive form representation. D. A finite dynamic game with complete information may also have a normal form representation.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.1P

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Which of the following statements about a Nash equilibrium is not correct? A. Each player plays a best response to opponents' Nash strategies. B. No player has a profitable unilateral deviation. C. For each finite noncoopertiave game there always exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. D. A game has at least two players. Which one of the following statements is incorrect? A. For dynamic games with complete information, not all subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points can be found by backward induction. B. A finite dynamic game with complete information may also have a normal form representation. C. A finite static game with complete information may not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. D. A finite static game with complete information cannot have an extensive form representation. Which one of the following statements is correct? A. A supergame cannot have any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. B. A supergame can only have finite number of subgame perfect Nash…
a. How many proper subgames does this dynamic game have? Explain briefly. b. Is it a game of perfect or imperfect information? Explain briefly. c. What is the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game? Show that it is unique.
Look at the attached table. A. What are the Nash equilibrium to this game (if there are any)? B. Are any of the Nash equilibrium efficient? If yes, which one(s)? If any are inefficient, explain why.
QUESTION 2 Which of the following statements about a Nash equilibrium is not correct? A. For each finite noncoopertiave game there always exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. B. A game has at least two players. C. Each player plays a best response to opponents' Nash strategies. D. No player has a profitable unilateral deviation.
a. Draw a game tree that represents this game. How many proper sub- games does it have? b. Are there other game trees that would work? Explain briefly. c. Construct the matrix representation of the normal form of this dynamic game.
9. Little Kona is a small coffee company that is consider- ing entering a market dominated by Big Brew. Each company's profit depends on whether Little Kona enters and whether Big Brew sets a high price or a low price: Little Kona Enter Don't Enter High Price Kona makes $2 million Kona makes zero Big Brew Brew makes $3 million Brew makes $7 million Kona loses $1 million Low Price Kona makes zero Brew makes $1 million Brew makes $2 million
6) The following is a static game D 2,2 0,3 D 3,0 1,1 a) Convert this game into dynamic form game b) Find the Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. c) If you consider this game as dynamic then what kind of dynamic game is this.
In a game, a Nash equilibrium is reached only if the players ________. a. understand the game and the payoffs associated with each strategy b. use backward induction to develop their strategies c. follow a mixed strategy d. have no best response for the choices made by other players
Which one of the following statements about the (modified) Stackleberg model is incorrect? A. Firm 1's move is a strategic move. B. Firm 2's move is a strategic move. C. It is can be solved by backward induction. D. It is a dynamic game.
Consider the attached game depicted in Normal Form. Find one Nash equilibrium and verify that it is a Nash equilibrium. Note: 1. Remember to express the Nash equilibrium in the form of a strategy profile. 2. Use the definition of Nash equilibrium to verify that the strategy profile you find is really a Nash equilibrium.
Which of the following is FALSE for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian game? A. Every Bayesian game in which there are finitely many players and finitely many actions and types for each player, there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium B. Every Bayesian game has multiple Bayesian Nash equilibria C. Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian game is the Nash equilibrium of its associated ex-ante normal form game
For the static game, whose payoff matrices are given above, answer the following questions: a. What is the IESDS prediction of the game’s outcome? Explain!b. Find all rationalizable strategies?c. Find all the Nash Equilibrium including mixed strategy equilibrium if any?d. What the difference between the solution concept in (a), (b), and (c).

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	A.	A finite static game with complete information may not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
	B.	For dynamic games with complete information, not all subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points can be found by backward induction.
	C.	A finite static game with complete information cannot have an extensive form representation.
	D.	A finite dynamic game with complete information may also have a normal form representation.