James Ford Rhodes (1848–1927). History of the Civil War, 1861–1865. 1917.

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  order to this effect he telegraphed to Thomas on December 11, “Let there be no further delay.” Meanwhile a storm of sleet had converted the hills about Nashville into slopes of slippery ice rendering any movement impossible until there should be a thaw: this was reported to Grant, who appeared to see in the intelligence only a further excuse for delay. In his unreasonable mood, he ordered General Logan to proceed to Nashville for the purpose of superseding Thomas in command of the Army of the Cumberland; 1 then, growing still more anxious, he decided to go thither himself and had reached Washington on the way when he received word that Thomas had made the attack.  15   Grant had been unjust to Thomas, looking at only one side of his character. While Thomas was deliberate unto slowness he had the situation well in hand after the battle of Franklin and was admirably fitted to cope with an impetuous general like Hood. This Sherman had divined when placing upon him such a weight of responsibility. Moreover, he had the confidence and devotion of his soldiers. In whatever way the circumstances may be regarded there was no justification for superseding him by Schofield or Logan; and the sequel showed that he was abundantly equal to the demands made upon him.  16   On December 15 Thomas attacked Hood and in the course of that day and the next struck him a crushing blow.  17   When in the spring of 1864, Grant took command of all the armies of the United States, the two salient features of his plan were the destruction or capture of Lee’s army and the crushing of the Confederate force in the Southwest. Before the close of the year one-half of the work had been accomplished. Hood’s army was disintegrated. Not all,
Note 1. This and the Army of the Ohio (Schofield’s) made up Thomas’s command. [back]