The True Cause of Conflict Between Athens and Sparta Essay examples

The Classical Era of Greece, 500 -338 BCE, made way to many different changes in Athenian history. The Athenian government changed from a tyranny to a democracy, and after the Persian war in 499 BCE, Athens’ started to became a military superpower, as well. Due to Themistocles advocating to build a stronger navy, their military power grew, causing Athens’ economy to rise becoming the richest city-states. The Peloponnesian War brought out the importance of politicians and leaders, because now the government is run by the people. This war brought two of the most prominent and influential individuals to lead Athens through the war and shaped Athens’ future. The two leaders are cousins, Pericles and Alcibiades. They have multiple similarities, like their lineage and education, while also utilizing their unique personalities in their leadership skills.

The Peloponnesian War pitted the Athenians against the Spartans. The Peloponnesians’ were an alliance of city-states controlled by Sparta. These two powerful city-states became locked in a struggle for dominance of the eastern Mediterranean area. The roots of the conflict and in particular this expedition is highly complex. As Thucydides says in his history of the war, the underlying cause was Spartan fear of Athens' expansive power. But, the triggering event was Athens' aggressive behavior towards Corinth, an ally of Sparta.

Without being either the ones who made this law or the first to apply it after it was laid down, we applied it as one in existence...and one that will endure for all time,” (Thuc., V, 105). The Athenians see no injustice in doing simply as their nature impels them to do. In fact, the Athenians see their offer of subjugation to the Melian people as more than reasonable, “What we will demonstrate is that we are here to help our empire and that there is salvation for your city in what we are now about to say, since we hope to rule over you without trouble and let both parties benefit as you are saved,” (Thuc., V, 91). Following their belief in doing what is necessary to strengthen themselves, even at the expense of others, is what brings Athens to Melos.

Athens and Sparta were both dominant powers in ancient Greece. However, a legendary rivalry existed between the two. When Athens ended its alliance with Corcyra in 433 B.C. and began to surround Potidaea, it threatened Corinth’s position. Sparta feared that Athens was becoming too powerful and tried to avert war. The Spartans believed that peace was possible if the Athenians would revoke measures against Sparta's ally, Megara. The Athenian leader, Pericles, refused to concur with this because Sparta and Athens had earlier agreed that conflicts would be solved by negotiation. If the Athenians would yield to Sparta's request, they would in fact be accepting Sparta’s orders. This was unacceptable, and as a result, war broke out. Athens and its Delian League were attacked by Sparta and its Peloponnesian League. Diodorus mentions that the Spartans did not just declare war, but sought additional support from Persia.

The Peloponnesian war lasted from 431 to 404 B.C. and was profoundly influenced by two Athenian men, Pericles and Alcibiades. Though Pericles and Alcibiades were related by blood they were quite different. Pericles was a diplomat, he approached matters with a level head and tried to find a solution that did not end in bloodshed. Alcibiades was less stable, he either fought, manipulated, or ran when confronted with a problem. Both men spoke eloquently enough to move almost the entire city of Athens, using their words to bend people to their will.  What was different between them was what their will was, one cared about the city and its wellbeing, the other cared about his own wellbeing.

Action from necessity is a constantly recurring theme in Thucydides’ The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. A sentiment used to explain the growth of the Athenian Empire which some Athenians espoused to an assembly at Sparta best quantifies necessity, “. . . we were necessarily compelled at first to advance the hegemony to where it is—especially by fear, and then by honor, and later by benefit.” (Selected Passages 1.75.3). This claim, referred to as the Athenian Thesis, is used to advance the two following implications: all states act with the motivations of fear, honor and interest and no one can condemn a state for doing so. The Athenian Thesis influences the way many of the Athenian elite structure their patterns of reasoning in both noticeable and subtle ways.

Throughout the Ancient Greek world, there have been many wars and standoffs. However, there has been only one which changed the course of Greek history forever; the Peloponnesian War. Caused by the growing tension between Athens and Sparta, it came and left, leaving only destruction in its wake. The defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War caused the downfall of Greece, and the end of the Classical Age.

The Greeks closest to the Persian Empire after the war created the Delian League to protect them from the Persians. The Greeks chose the Athenians to lead them. The Spartans were originally asked to lead them, but the kind was very arrogant, so they retracted their offer. The Spartans then created the Peloponnesian League because they didn’t think the Athenians should lead the Delian League because they were getting too much credit for defeating the Persians in the war. The two leagues didn’t get along at all. This rivalry eventually turned into the Peloponnesian War. This war went on for about 30 years. After the war, the government changed in Athens.

The Peloponnesian War brought disease, destruction, famine, widespread civil wars, and a huge loss of life. The war was a complete catastrophe for Athens, who never fully regained their empire back. Sparta won the war, but they didn’t become a great city and a new empire was never built. Sparta attempted to lead the Greeks, but soon fell short and new leaders were called forth.

In 431 B.C., even before the Peloponnesian War, Athens’ strength compared to other Greek polises was evident. Athens had islands, a powerful, a well-trained navy, and one, if not the best, general at the time: Pericles. Pericles says in his speech that, “war is inevitable,” but in fact the war was preventable (72). Even with all of the military strengths and assets that Athenians had afforded to them, they chose to be merciful to the Peloponnesians who were in no shape to go to war. They did not have the experience, money, manpower, or means to participate in a lengthy war and Pericles makes the citizens aware of this (70). Pericles is both modest and humble for choosing to point out these facts which in turn helps the Athenians see the potential

In The History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides chronicles the events, battles, and democratic processes of the war between Athens and Sparta. Shortly after war broke out, Pericles delivered his funeral oration in honor of the courageous Athenians who already perished in battle. Through his funeral oration, Pericles reveals the true nature of Athenians. Ultimately, they were good natured since all the citizens of Athens willingly and dutifully served their country, and ultimately the common good; the structure of Athens and its government provided many outlets to do so. This relationship between the government and the people delineated itself as one of mutual reciprocity, seeing that the nature of Athenians directly correlated with

Sparta’s initial strategy at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War was an end state to prevent Athens growing their power and from ruling all Hellas. The concept was to move forces slowly and moderately, devastating Attica, harass the city of Athens, and draw them out to fight land war, while avoiding naval engagement. . It would not be an easy and quick war, and should avoid any kind of engagement with Athenian fleet. Sparta had only one means to achieve the desired end state, its Army. This was possible only by land with the army marching every season from Sparta through Corinth, conducting operations in Attica and coming back home. Strategic vulnerability was long term sustainment, lack of funds, and time critical in that Sparta’s soldiers as farmers would not be able to mobilize for long campaigns. However, Athen’s military leaders, Pericles particularly, understood that Athenian sea power would be more effective against Sparta on land than Sparta’s land power at sea. As a conclusion of the analysis of the Sparta’s initial strategy, I assess, it was not suitable for a long term war as Sparta herself was not prepared for a prolonged war. Strategy was acceptable and feasible, but only during fighting season. So overall success would be questionable considering time sensitivity, which will give enough time for Athene to recover after fighting season.

The Peloponnesian war (431–404 BC) was an ancient Greek war fought by Athens against the Peloponnesian led by Sparta. Thucydides famously claims that the war started “because the Spartans were afraid of further growth of Athenian power, seeing as they did have the greater part of Hellas was under the control of Athens”. The two main protagonists from opposing sides Lysander and Alcibiades had the most influential impact on the end of the war.

The Peloponnesian War was the turning point in Athenian hegemony in Ancient Greece. It was fought in 431 B.C. between the Delian League, led by Athens, and the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta. According to Thucydides, Athens’ imposing hegemonic status and its overwhelming quest for more power made the Peloponnesian War and Athens’s eventual fall from power inevitable. Despite the Athenians having a far more superior navy and being considerably wealthier, they were defeated and made subjects of Sparta. In this paper, I will discuss Thucydides’ and Socrates’ reasons for why

Written by the Greek historian Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War is one that tells the story of the war (431-404 BC) which divided the Greek world between Athens and its allies and Lacedaemon. The Melian Dialogue presents two sides and two perspectives that of the Melians neutrality and that of the Athenians’ might. By Thucydides juxtaposing the Athenian’s position to that of the Melians, there is a clear conclusion of which side actions are tactically and morally acceptable. One would argue that the Athenians are immoral for violently plundering the Melian territory because they had the power to do so. However, given the circumstance of trying to defend their empire due to the imbalance of forces, the Athenian actions are not