3. True, false, or uncertain? Explain briefly. A Cournot duopolist and a Stackelberg follower have the same best response function. b. A cartel with two identical firms must evenly split production and profits. c. A price ceiling may lead a monopolist to increase output. d. The Cournot model with homogeneous costs has an equilibrium in dominant strategies. e. A payment of $5000 today is better than a payment of $5500 in one year.

3. True, false, or uncertain? Explain briefly. A Cournot duopolist and a Stackelberg follower have the same best response function. b. A cartel with two identical firms must evenly split production and profits. c. A price ceiling may lead a monopolist to increase output. d. The Cournot model with homogeneous costs has an equilibrium in dominant strategies. e. A payment of $5000 today is better than a payment of $5500 in one year.

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3SCQ: Consider the curve in the figure below, which shows the market demand. marginal cost, and marginal...

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Consider the curve in the figure below, which shows the market demand. marginal cost, and marginal revenue curve for firms in an oligopolistic industry. In this example, we assume firms have zero fixed costs. Suppose the firms collude to form a cartel. What price will the cartel charge? What quantity will the cartel supply? How much profit will the cartel earn? Suppose now that the cane] breaks up and the oligopolistic firms compete as vigorously as possible by cutting the price and increasing sales. What will be the industry quantity and price? What will be the collective profits of all firms in the industry? Compare the equilibrium price, quantity, and profit for the cartel and cutthroat competition outcomes.
Explain the general meaning of the profit payoff matrix below for oligopolists X and Y. All profit figures are in thousands. a. Use the payoff matrix to explain the mutual interdependence that characterizes oligopolistic industries. b. Assuming no collusion between X and Y, what is the likely pricing outcome? c. In view of your answer to 3b, explain why price collusion is mutually profitable. Why might there be a temptation to cheat on the collusive agreement?
For each statement in the left column find and match convenient part from the right column of the table: Write your answer A. The market, represented by a group of sellers, unified by an agreement on its segmentation and final price of the production, is considered as ... 1. ... for the oligopoly B. The situation in which society undergoes losses due to high prices and low output is more typical for ... 2 ... for the price discrimination C. The market in which several sellers can affect and control the price of products in an industry is typical for ... 3. ... for the price competition D. The situation when a different price is given for the same product is typical for ... 4. ... for the market of imperfect competition E. Limited resources is the main factor determining the situation typical for ... 5. ... for the perfect competition F. The absence of the supply curve is typical for... 6. ... for the cartel…
4:21 lLTE Work 13. In the Nash equilibrium of a prisoner's dilemma: 14. Suppose Acme and Mega produce and sell identical products and face zero marginal and average cost. Below is the market demand curve for their product 4 3 2 D 0 0 50 200 100 150 Quantity Suppose Acme and Mega decide to collude and work together as a monopolist with each firm producing half the quantity demanded by the market at the monopoly price. If Mega cheats on the agreement by red ucing its price to $1 and Acme matches the price cut, then if consumers are evenly split between the two firms, Acme's economic profit will be Price ($/unit)
a. They compete in quantities with each other (Cournot-Nash equilibrium). b. They collude as though they are all plants of the same single multi-plant monopoly. c. B and C act as two plants of a single multi-plant monopoly “B+C”, which competes in quantities (Cournot competition) against A.
Consider the curve in Figure, which shows the market demand, marginal cost, and marginal revenue curve for firms in an oligopolistic industry. In this example, we assume firms have zero fixed costs. a. Suppose the firms collude to form a cartel. What price will the cartel charge? What quantity will the carte supply? How much profit will the cartel earn? b. Suppose now that the cartel breaks up and the oligopolistic firms compete as vigorously as possible by cutting the price and increasing sales. What will be the industry quantity and price? What will be the collective profits of all firms in the industry? c. Compare the equilibrium price, quantity, and profit for the cartel and cutthroat competition outcomes.