Suppose the airline industry is an oligopoly with two competing firms, VolAir and ClearJet. Assume each airline sellstickets that are virtually identical and customers have no loyalty to either airline. Possible pricing outcomes in themarket are displayed on the graph to the left, while the two airlines' best response functions according to the Cournotmodel are shown on the graph to the right.Price per ticketOAсbyBQuAMRTickets per yearMCDemandTickets sold by Clearlet20001200Consider the pricing and demand graph. If the competitive outcome is represented by quantity Qc and price Pc and theperfect cartel outcome is represented by quantity Q and price PM, which point on the demand graph corresponds to theNash equilibrium outcome in the Cournot model?0VolAir'sbest responseClearJet'sbest response1200Tickets sold by VolAirD2000

Nash equilibrium is a concept in game theory where no player has an incentive to change their…

Suppose the airline industry is an oligopoly with two competing firms, VolAir and ClearJet. Assume each airline sells tickets that are virtually identical and customers have no loyalty to either airline. Possible pricing outcomes in the market are displayed on the graph to the left, while the two airlines' best response functions according to the Cournot model are shown on the graph to the right. Price per ticket 2 MR MC Demand 2000 VolAir's best response A 1200 Tickets sold by Clearjet Clearlet's best response

Suppose the airline industry is an oligopoly with two competing firms, VolAir and ClearJet. Assume each airline sells tickets that are virtually identical and customers have no loyalty to either airline. Possible pricing outcomes in the market are displayed on the graph to the left, while the two airlines' best response functions according to the Cournot model are shown on the graph to the right. Price per ticket 2 MR MC Demand 2000 VolAir's best response A 1200 Tickets sold by Clearjet Clearlet's best response

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.8P

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How would you present the market equilibrium point within an oligopolistic market via a diagram? Please clearly label where the market equlibrium is found. How would a decrease in demand change this market Equlibirum point in an oligopolistic market and how would you show this graphically?
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