the sub game-perfect equilibrium for F 1 > 2000 and F1<2000 and also predation affect the equilibrium.

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Chapter 12, Problem 12.9P

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To Compute: the sub game-perfect equilibrium for F1>2000 and F1<2000 and also predation affect the equilibrium.

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