Macroeconomics
21st Edition
ISBN: 9781259915673
Author: Campbell R. McConnell, Stanley L. Brue, Sean Masaki Flynn Dr.
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
expand_more
expand_more
format_list_bulleted
Question
Chapter 5.A, Problem 2AP
Subpart (a):
To determine
Calculation of combined spending by political parties.
Subpart (b):
To determine
Calculation pre-voters spending.
Subpart (c):
To determine
Calculation pre-voters spending.
Subpart (d):
To determine
Calculation of excess spending.
Expert Solution & Answer
Want to see the full answer?
Check out a sample textbook solution
Students have asked these similar questions
The following table shows the number of voters preferring various amounts of spending on
a new school.
Number of Voters
12
33
47
22
6
4
1
Select one:
a. $0.5
b. $1.5
c. $2.0
d. $1.0
Preferred Spending (millions)
$0.0
$0.5
$1.0
$1.5
$2.0
$2.5
$3.0
Refer to the table above. What is the preferred spending amount of the median voter?
1. A city has three equal-sized groups of people: (1) Type A people consistently prefer more public school expenditure; (2) Type B people prefer high levels of public school expenditure to low levels, and they prefer low levels to medium levels; (3) Type C people most prefer medium levels to low levels, and they prefer low levels to high levels.
Will majority voting generate consistent outcomes in this case? (Hint: you should check if there are cycles in outcomes by changing the order of voting)
A.True
B. False
2. Suppose Florida government has asked you to design and evaluate the effectiveness of an education voucher program. What is wrong with simply comparing the educational performance of those receiving vouchers with those who do not receive vouchers? Explain.
Please no written by hand
"No voting system is perfect." What does it mean by economist K. Arrow? Give a brief account on Condorcet Voting Paradox. A public school district is voting on the school budget and the resulting student-teacher ratio. A poll finds that 20 percent of the voters want a ratio of 9:1, 25 percent want a ratio of 10:1, 15 percent want a ratio of 11:1, and 40 percent want a ratio of 12:1. What outcome would you expect the district to
Knowledge Booster
Similar questions
- Answer to Part CAssume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jonesin an upcoming election.Assuming the following voter preferences:Voter ID Preference (1-9)A 4B 5C 6B. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? C. Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences?arrow_forward1.14. Consider a variation on the idea of a weighted voting system, inwhich one or more voters is given a negative weight. Show that sucha system is not monotone. If a voter knows that the method assigns anegative weight to her vote, how will she be inclined to cast her ballot?arrow_forwardLet's walk through the median voter theorem in a little more detail. Consider a town with three voters, Enrique, Nandini, and Torsten. The big issue in the upcoming election is how high the sales tax rate should be. As you'll learn in macroeconomics (and in real life), on average, a government that wants to do more spending has to bring in more taxes, so "higher permanent taxes" is the same as "higher government spending." Enrique wants low taxes and small government, Nandini is in the middle, and Torsten wants the biggest town government of the three. Each one is a stubborn person, and his or her favorite position-what economic theorists call the "ideal point-never changes in this problem. Their preferences can be summed up like this, with the x denoting each person's favorite tax rate: Enrique 0% N O Sales tax rate Nandini P Torsten 20% Suppose there are two politicians running for office, N and O (so ignore P for now). Enrique will vote for Choose your answer. Nandini will vote for…arrow_forward
- Answer to Part DAssume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jonesin an upcoming election.Assuming the following voter preferences:Voter ID Preference (1-9)A 4B 5C 6B. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? C. Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? D. If the tax in C induces 100% compliance…arrow_forwardWith the GOP now in control of the U.S. House of Representatives, four House members - Marjorie Taylor Greene (Georgia), Jim Jordan (Ohio), Kevin McCarthy (California), and Elise Stefanik (New York) - sit down to a victory pizza party. Their large mushroom pizza with "Greene" peppers (12 slices) is divided among the four House members as follows: Marjorie Jim Kevin Elise 3 slices 3 slices 4 slices 2 slices The Donald (Trump, not duck) shows up with whom Marjorie, Elise, and Jim each share one slice of pizza. Kevin smiles politely. The new distribution of pizza is now: Marjorie Jim Kevin Elise Donald 2 slices 2 slices 4 slices 1 slice 3 slices Is the new distribution of pizza more or less equal than the distribution before Donald arrived? a. What is the Gini ratio before Donald's arrival? Please show your work, namely, the values for fi, yı, f2, y2, and so forth. {Note: You may check your answer at https://goodcaculators.com/gini-coefficient-caculator/} b. What is the Gini ratio after…arrow_forwardAnswer to Part BAssume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jonesin an upcoming election.Assuming the following voter preferences:Voter ID Preference (1-9)A 4B 5C 6B. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference?arrow_forward
- Which of the following statements is false? a. Public choice economists often explain low voter turnouts in terms of the individual costs and benefits of voting. b. In some instances, simple majority voting leads to a project being undertaken even though the total costs of the project exceed the total benefits. c. If an individual will only vote if he or she feels that his or her vote will make a difference in the election, it is likely that he or she will vote. d. Simple majority voting fails to take into account the intensity of individuals' preferences.arrow_forward4.1. The vote-for-two method works as follows: Candidates get apoint whenever a voter ranks them first or second. The candidate withthe most points is declared to be the winner (or if several candidates tiefor the most points, they are all declared to be winners).(a) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Condorcet criterion?(b) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the anti-Condorcet criterion?(c) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Pareto property?(d) Is the vote-for-two method independent?arrow_forward
arrow_back_ios
arrow_forward_ios
Recommended textbooks for you
Economics (MindTap Course List)EconomicsISBN:9781337617383Author:Roger A. ArnoldPublisher:Cengage Learning
Microeconomics: Private and Public Choice (MindTa...EconomicsISBN:9781305506893Author:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. MacphersonPublisher:Cengage Learning
Economics: Private and Public Choice (MindTap Cou...EconomicsISBN:9781305506725Author:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. MacphersonPublisher:Cengage Learning
Macroeconomics: Private and Public Choice (MindTa...EconomicsISBN:9781305506756Author:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. MacphersonPublisher:Cengage Learning
Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:9781337617383
Author:Roger A. Arnold
Publisher:Cengage Learning
Microeconomics: Private and Public Choice (MindTa...
Economics
ISBN:9781305506893
Author:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson
Publisher:Cengage Learning
Economics: Private and Public Choice (MindTap Cou...
Economics
ISBN:9781305506725
Author:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson
Publisher:Cengage Learning
Macroeconomics: Private and Public Choice (MindTa...
Economics
ISBN:9781305506756
Author:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson
Publisher:Cengage Learning