Exploring Economics
8th Edition
ISBN: 9781544336329
Author: Robert L. Sexton
Publisher: SAGE Publications, Inc
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Chapter 15, Problem 7P
To determine
(a)
To explain:
The change in the market of diamonds, if the new mine does not cooperate with the Central Selling Organization.
To determine
(b)
To explain:
The effect on the Central Selling Organization diamond advertising if the new mines outside the direct control of the Central Selling Organization want to sell their diamonds in the open market.
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The cartel of copper exporting countries is called COPEC. As part of an international trade agreement, the United States has agreed to buy all the copper that COPEC wants to sell to the United States at a constant price of $100 per tonne. COPEC also sells copper in Europe at a price of $150 per tonne. COPEC acts just like a monopolist; if it finds it is profit maximising to sell in the United States at $100 per tonne and simultaneously to sell in Europe for $150 a tonne, what is the price elasticity of demand of COPEC’s copper in the European market? Carefully explain all the steps in the derivation of the value of the elasticity including the underlying economic theory approach behind it
The cartel of copper exporting countries is called COPEC. As part of an international trade agreement, the United States has agreed to buy all the copper that COPEC wants to sell to the United States at a constant price of $100 per tonne. COPEC also sells copper in Europe at a price of $150 per tonne. COPEC acts just like a monopolist; if it finds it is profit maximising to sell in the United States at $100 per tonne and simultaneously to sell in Europe for $150 a tonne, what is the price elasticity of demand of COPEC’s copper in the European market?
One of the most famous cartels of the past 50 years is OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The members of OPEC are countries rather than individual businesses. Oil Ministers from each of the countries meet regularly to establish how much each oil each country will produce each month (the amount each country agrees to produce is called its quota). Saudi Arabia is the largest oil-producing country in OPEC. Why does Saudi Arabia usually produce less than its quota each month?
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