Microeconomics
11th Edition
ISBN: 9781260507140
Author: David C. Colander
Publisher: McGraw Hill Education
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Question
Chapter 20.1, Problem 8Q
To determine
The difference between Vickrey auction and standard sealed-bid auction.
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What is Revenue Equivalence Theorem for the standard auction types?
parameter x =5
List all pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Discrete All-Pay Auction: In Section 6.1.4 we introduced a version of an all-
pay auction that worked as follows: Each bidder submits a bid. The highest
bidder gets the good, but all bidders pay their bids. Consider an auction in
which player 1 values the item at 3 while player 2 values the item at 5. Each
player can bid either 0, 1, or 2. If player i bids more than player j then i wins
the good and both pay. If both players bid the same amount then a coin is
tossed to determine who gets the good, but again both pay.
a. Write down the game in matrix form. Which strategies survive IESDS?
b. Find the Nash equilibria for this game.
Chapter 20 Solutions
Microeconomics
Ch. 20.1 - Prob. 1QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 2QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 3QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 4QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 5QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 6QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 7QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 8QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 9QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 10Q
Ch. 20.A - Netflix and Hulu each expects profit to rise by...Ch. 20.A - Prob. 2QECh. 20 - Prob. 1QECh. 20 - Prob. 2QECh. 20 - Prob. 3QECh. 20 - Prob. 4QECh. 20 - Prob. 5QECh. 20 - Prob. 6QECh. 20 - Prob. 7QECh. 20 - Prob. 8QECh. 20 - Prob. 9QECh. 20 - Prob. 10QECh. 20 - Prob. 11QECh. 20 - Prob. 12QECh. 20 - Prob. 13QECh. 20 - Prob. 14QECh. 20 - Prob. 15QECh. 20 - Prob. 16QECh. 20 - Prob. 1QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 2QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 3QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 4QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 5QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 6QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 1IPCh. 20 - Prob. 2IPCh. 20 - Prob. 3IPCh. 20 - Prob. 4IPCh. 20 - Prob. 5IPCh. 20 - Prob. 6IPCh. 20 - Prob. 7IP
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